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[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize 
it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and 
keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Ro-
man legions did, by putting your young men into the mud. 
 
   — T.R. Fehrenbach, THIS KIND OF WAR (1963) 
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     he M-4 carbine, standard issue for U.S. armed forces, has two firing op-
tions: semi-automatic and three-shot burst. When set to three-shot mode, 
the carbine discharges three rounds each time the trigger is pulled. These 
rounds inflict devastating injury. At the very moment you read this article, 
it is likely that hundreds if not thousands of U.S. service members, like 
their counterparts in multiple nations, are engaged in training with this and 
similar weapons. The training conditions soldiers1 to employ a three-round 
burst aimed at the center mass of the human silhouette once the decision 
to attack has been made. It does not involve sophisticated discussions 
about why shots are aimed at center mass, or why three-shot bursts are 
employed. For the soldier, the logic is self-evident: the employment of 
combat power against an enemy—whether an individual soldier firing her 
rifle, a tank gunner firing a highly-explosive anti-tank round, or an Apache 
pilot letting loose a salvo of rockets—is intended to completely disable the 
enemy in the most efficient manner in order to eliminate all risk that the 
opponent remains capable of continued participation in the fight. Because 
hesitation in the midst of armed hostilities produces unquestionable risk to 
friendly forces and erodes the good order and discipline essential to effec-
tive execution of military operations, the goal of such training is to develop 
a genuine sense of combat aggressiveness that is uncompromised by any 
such hesitation once an enemy target has been positively identified. 
Military training and professional development strives to inculcate this 
ethos into both the soldiers at the proverbial tip of the spear, and the 
commanders and staff officers who plan their operations. Close with and de-
stroy the enemy is the mantra of the U.S. infantry, and warfare is replete with 
examples of the lethality associated with combat operations. How soldiers 
are equipped, trained, and mentally developed for combat is just one indi-
cation of the brutal and deadly nature of warfare, or armed conflict in in-
ternational legal parlance. At its core, this endeavor involves the deliberate 
application of combat power that produces a high probability of causing 
                                                                                                                      
1. The term “soldier” is used as a generic description of all service members, and is 
not intended to suggest that the analysis in this article is limited to members of the U.S. 
Army or to diminish the challenges confronted by their counterparts in the Marine Corps, 
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death—the use of weapons (means) and tactics (methods) of warfare that 
could never, in any other context, be considered justified by domestic or 
international legal principles. One of the axiomatic rules of war is that the 
authority to employ this combat power—to attack—is justified based on a 
determination of enemy belligerent status: once a potential object of attack 
is positively identified as a member of an enemy belligerent group, these 
devastating means and methods of warfare may lawfully be utilized. This 
authority is not, however, unlimited, and terminates as no longer justified 
once the enemy is rendered combat ineffective as the result of disabling 
wounds or capture, conditions that clearly indicate the enemy belligerent is 
physically incapable of engaging in hostile conduct presumptively associat-
ed with this status. 
There is virtually no disagreement in the contemporary international 
discourse on the law of armed conflict (LOAC) with the rule that once an 
enemy belligerent becomes hors de combat—what a soldier would recognize 
as “combat ineffective”—the authority to employ deadly force terminates.2 
However, what qualifies as hors de combat and accordingly operates to rebut 
the status-based presumption of hostility and accordant targetability has 
become a flashpoint of current international legal debate. Until recently, 
almost all experts interpreted hors de combat to mean incapacitation resulting 
from wounds, sickness, or capture.3 Accordingly, an enemy belligerent falls 
within the proverbial crosshairs of status-based targeting authority unless 
and until rendered physically incapable of continuing to perform a belliger-
ent function. Furthermore, unless this incapacity is involuntary as the result 
of wounds or sickness, the individual enemy bears the burden of demon-
strating this incapacity through the act of surrender. Indeed, it is no exag-
geration to assert that members of the armed forces, especially members of 
the military legal profession charged with educating, training, and advising 
the armed forces, universally embrace this understanding of the law. 
Recently, however, some have forcefully asserted that the LOAC in-
cludes an obligation to capture in lieu of employing deadly force whenever 
doing so presents no meaningful risk to attacking forces, even if the enemy 
                                                                                                                      
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
3. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 159 (2010); A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
48–49 (2004); FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAG-








belligerent is neither physically disabled nor manifesting surrender. The 
convergence of a number of influences seems to have fueled this theory, 
including the increasing emphasis on the humanitarian foundation of the 
LOAC,4 the renewed assertion by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) that the principle of humanity imposes a “capture instead of 
kill” rule whenever tactically feasible,5 the widely-cited Israeli High Court of 
Justice opinion analyzing the legality of targeted killings,6 and most recently 
the work of one scholar who claims to have discovered highly probative 
but heretofore overlooked evidence of state practice and opinio juris that 
conclusively establishes this obligation.7 Proponents of this obligation to cap-
ture rather than kill, or to use the least harmful means to incapacitate ene-
my belligerents, do not contest the general authority to employ deadly 
force derived from belligerent status determinations. Instead, they insist 
that the conditions that rebut this presumptive attack authority are broader 
than the traditional understanding of the meaning of hors de combat em-
braced by military experts and include any situation where an enemy bellig-
erent who has yet to be rendered physically incapable of engaging in hostili-
ties may be subdued without subjecting friendly forces to significant risk of 
harm.8 
                                                                                                                      
4. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (2000); Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in XIX/1 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN 
LAW 95–128 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2010); Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate, 40 ISRA-
EL LAW REVIEW 648–60 (2007). 
5. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 81-82, (2008) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
6. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel 26 [2005] 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case]. 
7. Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUROPEAN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013). 
8. Id.; David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 LEIDEN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315, 320 (2013) (“I disagree that LOAC’s licensing function 
is as fundamental as its constraining function.”). But see Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Cap-
ture, 97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1268, 1272–73 (2013) (“in international humanitarian 
law . . . there simply is no codified duty to attempt the capture of enemy combatants”); Beth 
Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 
14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 255, 292 (2012) (“As a matter 
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This essay offers our collective and—we hope—comprehensive rebut-
tal of this least harmful means LOAC interpretation. Our approach relies 
on three analytical pillars. First, Section II reviews the fundamental princi-
ples of the LOAC that permit status-based attacks against enemy belliger-
ents with combat power highly likely to cause death unless and until the 
enemy is rendered physically incapable of participating in hostilities. This 
section also explains how the corporate notion of “enemy”—
fundamentally different from the concept of individualized threat that 
dominates human rights law’s perspective on the use of force—contributes 
to an effective understanding of attack authority. Section II also analyzes 
the consequences of presumption-based use-of-force authority.  
After briefly exploring the LOAC’s foundational components relating 
to a potential least harmful means rule—both core treaty provisions and 
customary principles—Section III thoroughly analyzes the affirmative pro-
hibitions on the use of force that the LOAC—and specifically Additional 
Protocol I—does require. This section then highlights what Additional 
Protocol I does not require. In particular, this section demonstrates that the 
fact that Additional Protocol I—by any account the most humanitarian-
oriented LOAC treaty ever developed—did not impose any affirmative 
least harmful means obligation vis-à-vis belligerents undermines any asser-
tion that any such obligation may be derived from the positive LOAC. In-
deed, the logical inference derived from the absence of any such positive 
obligation, coupled with the clearly limited scope of the protection provid-
ed by the LOAC principle of proportionality, rebuts the assertion that a 
least harmful means obligation can be found in the interstitial regions of 
the positive LOAC.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Section IV emphasizes how this 
least harmful means concept, especially when derived from an expanded 
interpretation of the meaning of the concept of hors de combat, is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the tactical, operational, and strategic objectives that 
dictate employment of military power. The LOAC, and its presumption-
based rules regarding use-of-force authority, serves the interests of all 
armed forces by providing a modicum of clarity in the midst of the chaos 
of armed hostilities.9 A least harmful means rule introduces extraordinary 
                                                                                                                      
IACs [international armed conflicts] in lieu of killing them in the absence of an unambigu-
ous offer of unconditional surrender.”). 
9. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949   394, (Claude Pilloud et al. eds., 1987) (noting 








operational complexities, running the gamut from training to implementa-
tion to accountability. Effective implementation of LOAC depends on the 
clarity of the legal principles, their application during the heat of battle, and 
their credible application post-hoc in investigations and prosecutions. 
Commanders and their forces can best adhere to the law and carry out its 
central tenets when the law and the obligations it imposes are predictable 
and operationally logical. Clarity and predictability in the form of bright 
line rules also bolster the law’s equally important role with regard to sol-
diers’ moral—not just physical—well-being. Restraint, when and where 
appropriate, is certainly central to the effective execution of combat opera-
tions and the development of morally grounded warriors. But ill-conceived 
demands to extend restraint beyond the scope of well-settled tactical and 
operational logic actually subjects soldiers to unjustified moral hazard. 
We are under no illusion that we will persuade all proponents of this 
least harmful means rule to reconsider their position. Nor are we insensi-
tive to the profound human consequences of a rule that legally authorizes 
attack with methods and means of warfare that are likely to cause death as 
a measure of first resort with no obligation to consider lesser means to in-
capacitate the target—even against an individual who may in fact pose little 
or no threat to an attacking force at that precise moment. If anything, the 
combined sixty-two years of military experience shared by three of the au-
thors—experience that required a very personal sensitivity to the human 
dimension of warfare—makes it impossible for us not to appreciate these 
consequences. But this experience, and our continued collective experience 
of working closely with those who remain engaged in the physically, men-
tally, and morally demanding business of fighting our nation’s wars, also 
informs our view that the LOAC must, as it has historically, remain ration-
ally grounded in the realities of warfare.  
We are confident that anyone grappling with this issue understands that 
decisions related to the employment of combat power are not resolved in 
the quiet and safe confines of law libraries, academic conferences, or even 
courtrooms; they are resolved in the intensely demanding situations into 
which our nation thrusts our armed forces. Even in the context of deliber-
ate targeting decisions from stand-off locations (which many scholars and 
commentators characterize as more sanitized or “easier” than engaging in 
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close combat,10 an assertion that reveals a lack of appreciation of the true 
nature of such decisions), the intensity of the demands associated with the 
decision to take human life are profound. We cannot and will not deny the 
significant influence this focus on the actual implementation of law in the 
wide array of situations within which combatants must function imposes 
on our analysis. Ultimately, we believe this operational perspective remains 
the essential analytical perspective for a body of law developed principally 
to regulate armed hostilities. 
 
II. WHAT THE LOAC’S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TELL US 
 
The LOAC’s unambiguous objective is to facilitate the ability of armed 
forces to achieve their strategic military objective while mitigating, to the 
extent feasible, the humanitarian suffering resulting from armed conflict. 
The entire corpus of the LOAC (positive treaty provisions and customary 
international law) serves this objective in any type of armed conflict, mak-
ing it an essential animating force in any interpretation of the law. Interpre-
tations inconsistent with this objective undermine the credibility of the law 
by attenuating conflict regulation from the realities and necessities of the 
battle space.  
The core LOAC principles of military necessity and humanity, which 
together provide the normative foundation for the increasingly expanding 
corpus of more specific LOAC regulatory principles and rules, frame and 
underlie the LOAC’s central objective. These two core principles, there-
fore, provide the logical starting point for analyzing the scope of the au-
thority to use force when attacking a belligerent opponent. Although mili-
tary necessity and humanity are often characterized as reflecting the balance 
between authority and constraint inherent in the legal regulation of hostili-
ties, viewing these principles only as competing is misleading. Instead, mili-
tary necessity and humanity are more properly understood as complimen-
tary: since military necessity justifies only those measures not otherwise 
prohibited by international law that are necessary for bringing about the 
prompt submission of an enemy, it never justifies any measure that violates 
                                                                                                                      
10. See, e.g., John Kaag, Drones, Ethics and the Armchair Soldier, OPINIONATOR, NEW 









the principle of humanity.11 Accordingly, the LOAC provides that any 
measure justified by military necessity is conclusively consistent with the 
principle of humanity, because if it were not, it would already be prohibit-
ed.12 The remaining two core principles of the LOAC are distinction and 
proportionality. As these four principles form the foundation for the more 
specific rules of the contemporary LOAC and the arguments we advance, a 
brief discussion of each principle’s primary attributes is necessary to set the 
foundation for the detailed discussion to follow. 
 
A. The Core Principles 
 
Military necessity “justifies those measures not forbidden by international 
law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the 
enemy as soon as possible.”13 Accordingly, military necessity provides the 
normative basis for employing those measures necessary to bring an enemy 
to submission, including the application of deadly combat power. Howev-
er, the principle also provides an essential constraint on the authority of 
armed forces.14 Indeed, military necessity does not justify departures from 
the LOAC.15 Military necessity therefore reflects a balance between the au-
                                                                                                                      
11. See U.S. Department  of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 9 ¶ 3(a) 
(1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]; see also LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT, 122–25 (2d ed. 2000); ROGERS, supra note 3, at 3–7. 
12. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Hu-
manitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 795 (2010). 
13. FM 27-10, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
14. See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 44 n. 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
15. See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 393 (“Military necessity means the 
necessity for measures which are essential to attain the goals of war, and which are lawful 
in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Consequently a rule of the law of armed 
conflict cannot be derogated from by invoking military necessity unless this possibility is 
explicitly provided for by the rule in question.”). Up through World War II, some nations 
viewed military necessity as a trump card for all other humanitarian constraints. The Ger-
man doctrine of Kriegsraison asserted that war could justify any measures—even in violation 
of the laws and customs of war—when justified by the necessities of any particular situa-
tion. However, “[w]ar crimes trials after World War II clearly rejected this view. Military 
necessity cannot justify actions absolutely prohibited by law, as the means to achieve mili-
tary victory are not unlimited. Armed conflict must be carried on within the limits set by 
International Law.” OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADIAN DEFENCE 
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thority to inflict harm and the obligation to limit suffering that lies at the 
very core of combat regulation. This balance is reflected in Napoleon’s 
maxim, “[i]n politics and war alike, every injury done to the enemy, even 
though permitted by the rules, is excusable only so far as it is absolutely 
necessary; everything beyond that is criminal.”16 
The principle of humanity provides an essential counterbalance to the 
authority to employ measures to defeat an enemy in armed conflict. In 
practice, the principle of humanity provides the foundation for two critical 
limits on the authority to inflict suffering in the context of armed conflict: 
first, the prohibition against subjecting an opponent to superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering (injury or suffering beyond that which is necessary 
to efficiently incapacitate the opponent); and second, the obligation to en-
sure the humane treatment of any person (even a captured enemy) who is 
no longer or never was actively participating in armed hostilities.17 Com-
mon Article 3 extended the principle of humanity to non-international 
armed conflicts in 1949,18 leading to a general symmetry in the application 
                                                                                                                      
AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS 2-1–2-2 (2001), available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/Training-formation/LOAC-DDCA_2004-
eng.pdf. 
16. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 242 (1994) (citing 7 MAX HU-
BER, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VOLKERRECHE 353 (1913)). 
17. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE 
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 2.4–2.4.3 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL 
ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT]. This principle of humanity is the central focus of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and is implemented through numerous LOAC treaty 
provisions. These include the prohibition against the use of any type of coercion against a 
prisoner of war or civilian internee; the obligation to search for and collect the wounded 
and sick and ensure that priority of medical care is based solely on medical considerations; 
the obligation to search for and collect the shipwrecked at sea; the obligation to provide 
notice of capture of enemy personnel to the enemy state through a neutral intermediary; 
the obligation to facilitate the efforts of neutral relief agencies; the extensive immunities 
from attack afforded to places engaged in medical functions; and even the obligation to 
maintain and record the location of interment of the enemy dead. See generally Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
GC III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
18. See art. 3 of GC I, GC II, GC III, and GC IV, all supra note 17 [hereinafter Com-








of the principle of humanity to both interstate armed conflicts and armed 
conflicts between a state and non-state belligerent groups. This symmetry is 
consistent with the universally accepted view that humane treatment is a 
fundamental principle found at the very core of the Geneva tradition of 
protecting victims of war in all situations of hostilities.19 
The principle of distinction, one of the “cardinal principles” of the 
LOAC,20 further implements the authority derived from military necessity 
in relation to attack decisions. This principle obligates all participants in 
hostilities to distinguish between individuals who qualify as lawful objects 
of attack (enemy belligerents and any other individual taking a direct part in 
hostilities) and all other persons.21 Only the former may be deliberately at-
tacked.22 Distinction also obligates parties to distinguish between civilian 
objects and military objectives, and target only the latter. Article 48 of Ad-
ditional Protocol I sets forth the basic rule:  
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian pop-
ulation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
                                                                                                                      
19. According to the Commentary on Common Article 3:  
 
Humane treatment.—We find expressed here the fundamental principle underlying 
the four Geneva Conventions. It is most fortunate that it should have been set forth 
in this Article, in view of the decision to dispense with a Preamble. The value of the 
provision is not limited to the field dealt with in Article 3. Representing, as it does, 
the minimum which must be applied in the least determinate of conflicts, its terms 
must a fortiori be respected in the case of international conflicts proper, when all the 
provisions of the Convention are applicable. For “the greater obligation includes the 
lesser”, as one might say.  
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 3 GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE 
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY 38 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) 
[hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY]. 
20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) (Higgins, J., dissenting on unrelated grounds) (declaring that distinction 
and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering are the two cardinal principles of interna-
tional humanitarian law). 
21. A second and equally important aspect of distinction is that persons who are 
fighting (whether soldiers, members of organized armed groups or others) must distin-
guish themselves from inoffensive civilians. Like the prohibition on deliberately targeting 
civilians, this obligation is central to the LOAC’s fundamental goal of protecting civilians 
in the course of armed conflict. To this end, the LOAC prohibits perfidy, which occurs 
when an individual launches an attack while leading the enemy to believe he or she (the 
attacker) is protected from attack. In other words, an individual cannot pretend to be inof-
fensive and then attack—such as a suicide bombing by an individual dressed as a local 
civilian. 
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times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accord-
ingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives.23  
 
This principle ensures that the application of combat power is restricted to 
targets that contribute to the submission of an opponent’s military capabil-
ity, or fall within the scope of military necessity. 
Distinction requires identification of lawful targets as a prerequisite to 
launching an attack. A lawful attack may only be directed at a legitimate 
target as defined by the LOAC: either a combatant, a member of an orga-
nized armed group, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a place 
or thing qualifying as a military objective. The principle of distinction rests 
on two presumptions: belligerent personnel, their equipment and facilities, 
and all other places and things that meaningfully contribute to an enemy’s 
military capabilities are lawful objects of attack; all other persons, places, or 
things are immune from attack. However, neither of these presumptions is 
conclusive. An enemy belligerent operative who is captured or unambigu-
ously indicates desire to surrender is no longer the lawful object of attack 
for the obvious reason that disabling him by attack is no longer justified by 
military necessity.24 A civilian who takes up arms and engages in hostilities 
against military forces is no longer immune from attack for the equally ob-
vious reason that disabling that civilian is necessary in order to protect al-
lied forces.25  
These presumptions demonstrate that distinction is unquestionably de-
rived from the concept of military necessity. Because the law presumes that 
deliberately employing combat power against civilians or civilian property 
does not contribute to the core objective of defeating the enemy, distinc-
tion prohibits combatants from making civilians or civilian property the 
deliberate objects of attack. This prohibition is not, however, absolute. If a 
civilian engages in conduct that is considered to be taking a “direct part in 
hostilities”—in other words, conduct that presents a threat to armed forces 
analogous to that posed by an enemy soldier—the protection is suspended 
                                                                                                                      
23. Id., art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary international law. See JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW 3–8 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. 
24. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 41. 








for the duration of the participation and the civilian may be attacked.26 
Analogous limitations apply to the protections established for places and 
things; for example, a hospital, a place benefiting from perhaps the most 
extensive LOAC protection from attack, loses that protection if it is used 
by enemy forces to launch attacks in violation of its protected status.27 
Finally, the principle of proportionality requires that parties refrain 
from attacks on lawful military objectives when the expected loss of life or 
damage to civilian property will be excessive in relation to the anticipated 
concrete and direct military advantage to be gained.28 Proportionality is not 
a separate legal standard as such, but imposes the obligation that those de-
ciding to launch an attack must balance the military advantage anticipated 
from attacking a lawful target against the known but non-deliberate detri-
mental consequences to persons and places protected from deliberate at-
tack when they believe the attack is likely to cause incidental damage to ci-
vilian personnel or collateral damage to civilian property. However, an at-
tack does not become unlawful when the expected collateral damage or 
incidental injury is slightly greater than the military advantage anticipated 
(as is suggested by the term “disproportionate”), but only when those ef-
fects are “excessive.”29 For the purposes of this article, it is even more im-
portant to note that unlike the peacetime principle of proportionality,30 the 
                                                                                                                      
26. Id. 
27. GC IV, supra note 17, art. 19. 
28. Additional Protocol I contains three separate statements of the principle of pro-
portionality. The first appears in Article 51, which sets forth the basic parameters of the 
obligation to protect civilians and the civilian population, and prohibits any “attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil-
ian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.” AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(5)(b). See also FM 27-
10, supra note 11, ¶ 41. This language demonstrates that Additional Protocol I contem-
plates incidental civilian casualties, and appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b), 
each of which refers specifically to precautions in attack. Proportionality is not a mathe-
matical concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that military commanders weigh the 
consequences of a particular attack and refrain from launching attacks that are likely to 
cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of proportionality is well-accepted as an ele-
ment of customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts. Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 20, ¶ 20; CIHL, supra note 23, at 46; Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale 
eds., 2006); DINSTEIN, supra note 3. 
29. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 130–31. 
30. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
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LOAC principle in no way protects the object of attack—the lawful target. 
Instead, it protects only civilians and civilian property the commander rea-
sonably knows or should know will be harmed by attacking the lawful 
proximate target where the commander does not have the purpose to in-
flict that harm. 
 
B. Belligerents vs. Civilians 
 
The LOAC categorizes persons in armed conflict as belligerents or civilians 
in order to facilitate implementation of the distinction obligation. Indeed, 
because belligerents are subject to attack based on that status, this categori-
zation lies at the heart of the operationalization of the principle of distinc-
tion. Status-based targeting means that belligerent personnel qualify as law-
ful objects of attack at all times and in all places for as long as they remain 
under the operational command and control of enemy leadership and are 
physically capable of acting under that authority. The rule of military objec-
tive included in Additional Protocol I further implements the principles of 
military necessity and distinction in relation to defining individuals who 
qualify as lawful objects of attack. All members of an enemy belligerent 
force fall within the scope of that definition, and may therefore be attacked 
at all times and in all places.31 Indeed, this scope of attack authority is a tac-
tical and operational maxim, and is inherent in the weapons and tactics his-
torically associated with armed forces and armed conflict.32  
In international armed conflicts, the Third Geneva Convention and 
Additional Protocol I define categories of belligerents who qualify for pris-
oner of war status and are combatants. All members of the state’s regular 
                                                                                                                      
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx 
[hereinafter UN Principles]; see also McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom, 324 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) ¶ 149 (“In this respect the use of the term ‘absolutely necessary’ in Arti-
cle 2(2) indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed 
from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, 
the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in 
sub-paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2.”) (citing the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, infra note 201). 
31. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 515; DINSTEIN, supra note 3 at 89.  See 
also note 132 and accompanying text, infra.  
32. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 635; see also note 130 and accompany-








armed forces are combatants and can be identified by the uniform they 
wear, among other characteristics.33 Other persons falling within the cate-
gory of combatant include members of volunteer militia who meet four 
requirements: wearing a distinctive emblem, carrying arms openly, operat-
ing under responsible command, and abiding by the LOAC.34 Members of 
the regular armed forces of a government not recognized by the opposing 
party and civilians participating in a levée en masse also qualify as prisoners of 
war in international armed conflict.35 Such persons can be attacked at all 
times and enjoy no immunity from attack, except when they are hors de com-
bat due to sickness, wounds, or capture. In non-international armed con-
flicts, including state versus non-state actor conflicts, there is no combatant 
status pursuant to treaty definition, but individuals who are members of 
state forces or members of organized armed groups are customarily under-
stood to qualify as belligerents, and are therefore legitimate targets of attack 
at all times.36 State practice validates that the authority to attack members 
of the armed forces applies with equal force to attacking members of any 
organized belligerent group engaged in armed conflict, whether interna-
tional or non-international in nature;37 a view supported by a majority of 
LOAC experts.38 
                                                                                                                      
33. GC III, supra note 17, art. 4(1).  
34. Id., art. 4(A)(2).  
35. Id., arts. 4(A)(3), 4(A)(6).  
36. See Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 51 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2005); INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, 
supra note 5, at 27, 28; see also JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70–76 (2011) (Discussing the rules governing targeting of 
enemy forces in international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) “a 
member of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to 
attack” in international armed conflict; and (2) “subjecting members of organized belliger-
ent groups to status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who 
periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and consistent with the 
practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts”). 
37. See generally INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 5. 
38. For example, such belligerent operatives are characterized as “fighters” in the San 
Remo Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. The Manual indicates that fight-
ers are analogous to combatants for targeting purposes. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, 
CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY (2006). Similarly, the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance emphasizes that non-international armed conflict is a contest between 
organized belligerent groups. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 27–28. See also 
Geoffrey S. Corn & M. Christopher Jenks, Two Sides of the Combatant COIN: Untangling Con-
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Article 43 of Additional Protocol I established the first treaty definition 
of “combatant.”39 It incorporates by reference the categories of prisoners 
of war from the Third Geneva Convention noted above,40 but excludes 
from the definition civilians who qualify for prisoner of war status by virtue 
of their association with the armed forces and the support roles they per-
form (the so-called “civilians accompanying the forces in the field”). Article 
43’s definition thus clarifies that all members of the regular armed forces, 
and all militia and volunteer forces associated with the regular armed forces 
(as well as partisans), qualify as combatants within the meaning of the 
LOAC.41 
As noted above, the attack authority derived from belligerent group 
membership and status is then extended by custom and practice to other 
belligerent operatives who do not qualify as lawful combatants within the 
meaning of Article 43. Accordingly, the LOAC permits attack, or deliberate 
targeting of individuals, based not on a manifestation of actual threat, but 
instead based on the presumptive threat derived from the determination of 
enemy belligerent status.42 Once that status is determined, these individuals 
qualify as lawful objects of attack, meaning that the LOAC permits armed 
forces to use the most efficient means to incapacitate them, which in war-
fare is synonymous with the use of deadly combat power as a measure of 
first resort.  
Understanding this LOAC framework for the categorization of bellig-
erents and civilians and the accordant consequences of such categorizations 
and status is critical when analyzing whether the law imposes an additional 
least harmful means obligation. As explained in greater detail below, the 
authority to employ deadly combat power as a first resort applies only to 
the status-based targeting of belligerents and not to civilians. As a result, 
                                                                                                                      
SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (2012). 
39. AP I, supra note 2, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a con-
flict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Con-
vention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostili-
ties.”). 
40. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 510. 
41. AP I, supra note 2, art. 43 (“1) The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of 
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to 
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a gov-
ernment or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. . . . 2) Members of the armed 
forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to par-
ticipate directly in hostilities.”). 








lawful attack always requires a predicate assessment of civilian or belliger-
ent status.43 Furthermore, rules and obligations with regard to the use of 
force against civilians do not provide any definitive interpretive weight to 
extend this least harmful means obligation to operations directed against 
enemy belligerents.  
This distinction is critical background when considering the impact of 
the Israeli High Court opinion in the Targeted Killings case, which is com-
monly proffered as support for the asserted evolution of a least harmful 
means obligation. In that case, the Israeli High Court of Justice required 
the Israel Defense Forces to use the least-harmful means feasible when tar-
geting civilians who are directly participating in hostilities in the West 
Bank.44 However, because the Court concluded that the individuals subject 
to the attacks at issue in that case could not qualify as combatants and were 
subject to attack only as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, it never 
addressed the applicability of this least harmful means rule to anyone quali-
fying as a belligerent operative. While undoubtedly controversial, extending 
this limitation to civilians directly participating in hostilities is arguably toler-
able, as those individuals are not being attacked due to a status that triggers 
a presumption of threat, but instead due to individual conduct that estab-
lishes threat. Accordingly, their incapacitation is focused on an individual-
ized objective and is not intended to exact the broader goal of impacting 
enemy belligerent leadership or the “enemy” in the collective sense.45 The 
fact that the High Court held that such an obligation exists for targeting 
civilians directly participating in hostilities simply does not provide any 




                                                                                                                      
43. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying 
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LEGAL STUDIES 54 (2010); see also GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 164–65 (2012); Laurie R. Blank, Taking Distinction to 
the Next Level: Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL-
PARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 765 (2012). 
44. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 6, ¶ 60 (“Harming such civilians, even if the result 
is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no other less harmful means, and on 
the condition that innocent civilians nearby are not harmed.”). 
45. See generally Corn & Jenks, supra note 38. 
46. With regard to the relevance of the Targeted Killings case for other facets of the 
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C. Military Necessity and Humanity Do Not Mandate a Least Harmful Means Rule 
 
The relationship between military necessity and the strategic, operational, 
and tactical objectives of armed hostilities provides the essential context for 
analyzing if and when the LOAC imposes a least harmful means limitation 
on attacking enemy belligerent forces. From the first codified articulation 
of military necessity until the present day, this principle has been under-
stood to authorize the application of deadly combat power against any bel-
ligerent opponent under the operational authority of enemy leadership and 
physically capable of acting to effectuate that leader’s will.47 This broad 
scope of authority is directly linked to the primary objective of engaging in 
armed conflict: to bring the enemy into prompt submission as rapidly and 
efficiently as possible. Accordingly, military necessity has always been dis-
tinct from the peacetime authority provided by the concept of necessity. In 
the peacetime context, necessity certainly permits the use of force against 
individuals when such use is required to prevent unlawful conduct that pre-
sents an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm to government 
actors or other members of society.48 In that context, therefore, the sole 
objective of the use of force justified by necessity is to subdue the individ-
ual threat. In contrast, military necessity provides a much broader scope of 
authority: that which is required to bring the enemy, in the collective sense, 
into submission. The enemy belligerent is acting as an agent for the enemy 
leadership;49 as a result, the authority to use force extends well beyond the 
peacetime objective of subduing or disabling the individual.  
                                                                                                                      
47. See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER, WAR DEPARTMENT, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code].  
48. See UN Principles, supra note 30; see also McCann, supra note 30; Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
49. The concept of the individual soldier as the agent of the state dates back nearly 
two centuries to Jean Jacques Rousseau, who used the concept in formulating the principle 
of noncombatant immunity:  
 
Since the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy State, it is legitimate to kill the 
latter’s defenders so long as they are carrying arms; but as soon as they lay them 
down and surrender, they cease to be enemies or agents of the enemy, and 
again become mere men, and it is no longer legitimate to take their lives. 
 
Daphné Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and Reciproc-
ity, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO ASYMMET-
RIC WARFARE 116 (William Banks ed., 2010) (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CON-








This distinction highlights an essential aspect of the prohibition against 
arbitrary state action, which is a norm of universal applicability.50 Interna-
tional law prohibits all arbitrary deprivations of life inflicted by a state actor 
—a killing not justified by legal necessity would qualify as arbitrary in viola-
tion of international law.51 However, these distinct concepts of peacetime 
and LOAC necessity dictate that the assessment of when such use of force 
is in fact arbitrary must be different in the two contexts and therefore must 
be made based on the relevant applicable law.52 From a military operations 
perspective, conceding that state actors are prohibited in either context 
from arbitrary deprivations of life is not particularly troubling, as long as 
the most critical distinction between peacetime and wartime authority is 
recognized—that an essential aspect of armed conflict is the legitimate ap-
                                                                                                                      
50. See Kenneth M. Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 8 (2004); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). See also PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, 
supra note 9, at 391 (“If one were to renounce the rule, by which Parties to the conflict do 
not have an unlimited right, one would enter the realm of arbitrary behavior, i.e. an area 
where law does not exist, whether this was intended or not.”). 
51. According to the International Court of Justice:  
 
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Arti-
cle 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a 
time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a 
provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life ap-
plies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, how-
ever, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostili-
ties. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon 
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 
6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.  
 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 20, ¶ 25. 
52. See, e.g., id.; McCann, supra note 30. See also Ohlin, supra note 8, at 1272–73 (“Ne-
cessity, it turns out, means something quite different depending on the background legal 
norms that structure each particular body of law. In other words, it is not so clear that the 
concept of necessity in the domestic law of self-defense can be transplanted, without sig-
nificance alteration, to the domain of IHL. The concept of necessity turns out to be some-
thing resembling a term of art in IHL, with a specific meaning that diverges from how the 
term is understood and applied in other normative regimes.”); William Gerald Downey Jr., 
The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
251, 252 (1953) (“One of the most important concepts in the law of war is that of military 
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plication of deadly combat power as a measure of first resort—and the jus-
tification for such use is not limited to the reduction of an individualized 
actual threat.  
The principle of humanity does protect belligerent operatives, notwith-
standing a reliance on lethal force as a first resort. However, this protection 
is principally applicable only after the individual belligerent has been inca-
pacitated as an operative of enemy leadership, either as the result of 
wounds, sickness, or capture.53 Pre-incapacitation, the principle of humani-
ty protects belligerent operatives only from the infliction of unnecessary 
suffering.54 Although the importance of this principle of constraint is well 
established, it must be emphasized that a prohibition against inflicting un-
necessary suffering upon combatants necessarily implies that the infliction of 
a wide range of necessary suffering is legitimate. It is therefore essential to 
determine when harm intentionally inflicted upon an active belligerent op-
ponent is necessary within the meaning of the law.  
The starting point for this analysis is the rule of military objective: be-
cause enemy personnel automatically qualify as lawful military objectives, 
                                                                                                                      
53. For example, the UK Ministry of Defense Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict 
notes that: 
 
A combatant is entitled to continue fighting up to the moment of his 
surrender without losing the benefits of quarter and his rights as a pris-
oner of war. No vengeance can be taken since that person has simply 
done his duty up to the moment of his surrender. The mere fact that a 
soldier is wounded does not necessarily mean that he is incapacitated. 
There have been many examples of soldiers who continued to fight 
though wounded. It is only when he surrenders or is rendered incapable 
of fighting because of his wounds that he becomes hors de combat. 
 
UK MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 5.6.1. 
54. See Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
Its Annex, Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV] (establishing that the 
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited); see also Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 20, ¶ 78 (concluding that this prohi-
bition against the infliction of unnecessary suffering is a “cardinal” principle of interna-
tional humanitarian law); FM 27-10, supra note 11, ¶ 34; Declaration Renouncing the Use, 
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 
1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp? 
action=openDocument&documentId=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C [herein-
after St. Petersburg Declaration] (“the only legitimate object which States should endeav-
our to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; That for this 








they are lawful objects of attack by virtue of that status.55 Accordingly, the 
engagement of such personnel with deadly combat power, and the suffer-
ing inflicted upon them as a result of such engagement, is considered nec-
essary as a matter of law. Employing deadly combat power against a bellig-
erent operative when capture might have been a feasible alternative for 
subduing him has never been considered to violate the prohibition against 
inflicting unnecessary suffering. Instead, the principle prohibits employing 
methods or means of warfare that cause death in a way considered by the 
international community to be unnecessarily painful or pernicious (for ex-
ample, chemical weapons), or that needlessly aggravate the suffering of an 
opponent who survives attack but is rendered hors de combat. Article 23 of 
the Regulations Annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention II accordingly 
prohibited employing means of warfare of a “nature” to cause unnecessary 
suffering.56 However, when revised in 1907, the language was modified to 
include a scienter element, prohibiting only means of warfare calculated to 
cause unnecessary suffering.57 Additional Protocol I then extended the 
prohibition to both means and methods of warfare, and included within 
the scope of the prohibition means and methods calculated or of a nature 
likely to produce such needless aggravation.58  
Whether the contemporary customary law principle prohibiting em-
ploying methods or means of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering in-
cludes a scienter requirement is unlikely, but not absolutely clear. However, 
as explained in detail below, even Additional Protocol I’s resurrection of 
the 1899 Hague “of a nature to” language and extension to methods of 
warfare does not result in a prohibition against attacking an enemy with 
deadly combat power when capture is a possible alternate option for sub-
duing the individual. Nor, as explained below, do the limitations that arise 
in the “twilight zone” between pre- and post-submission status—such as 
the restraint applicable once an enemy belligerent becomes hors de combat, 
but before he is within the full control of a capturing power—alter these 
                                                                                                                      
55. See DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 89, 92. 
56. See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land 
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(e), 
July 29, 1899, 31 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (“To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury”) [hereinafter Hague II]. 
57. See Hague IV, supra note 54, art. 23(e) (“To employ arms, projectiles, or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”). 
58. AP I, supra note 2, art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
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presumptions. Instead, the law clearly places the burden on the enemy bel-
ligerent who has not been incapacitated as the result of wounds or sickness 
to affirmatively manifest his surrender and accordant severance from ene-
my leadership. Absent such manifestation, the presumptive threat associat-
ed with belligerent status continues to justify attack, even if the individual 
poses no actual threat and may be easily subdued with less harmful means. 
As noted above, this broad scope of attack authority—an authority that 
permits employing methods and means of warfare likely to produce death 
as a first resort—is diametrically opposed to the authority of state actors to 
employ deadly force in a peacetime context. Use of deadly force against 
individuals who are not reasonably identified as belligerent opponents in an 
armed conflict is strictly cause-based: there must be a causal connection 
between the conduct of the particular individual subjected to the use of 
force and the resort to deadly force.59 Accordingly, resort to force likely to 
produce death as a first resort is presumptively invalid, and is justified only 
when the state actor reasonably assesses a genuine individual necessity to 
bypass or forego a less harmful means and to resort immediately to such 
force.60 Moreover, even when individual cause justifies resort to force, the 
degree of force may be only that which is necessary to reduce the individual 
threat. The state actor can therefore only employ deadly force when no 
lesser means will effectively reduce a direct and specific threat.61  As a re-
sult, any resort to force likely to produce death outside the context of bel-
ligerent targeting in armed conflict is always considered a measure of last 
resort, (or, as one court in the United Kingdom noted, the deliberate killing 
                                                                                                                      
59. See generally INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 5; William A. Schabas, Parallel 
Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Lex Special-
is? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operations of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Con-
flict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 592, 604 (2007); David 
Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence?, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 176 (2005). 
60. Schabas, supra note 59, at 604. See also Milanovic, supra note 4, at 118–19 (Distin-
guishing attack authority in the LOAC from the necessity-based principle in peacetime: 
“[i]n other words, [in armed conflict] one belligerent party does not need to prove any 
kind of necessity to kill combatants belonging to the other belligerent party in order to be 
able to do so lawfully.”). 
61. UN Principles, supra note 30, at 112 (Stating that force can only be used “in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to 
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to 
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or 
her escape, and only when the less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objec-








of a human being is always prima facie unlawful).62 Understanding the nature 
and purpose of belligerent targeting in armed conflict and the specific pre-
sumptions on which it rests is therefore an essential component of any 
analysis of a potential capture rather than kill obligation. 
 
1. Military Necessity and the Corporate Aspect of the Enemy 
 
A rule that prohibits attacking an enemy belligerent operative when inca-
pacitation can be feasibly achieved by capture is based on an inference that 
using deadly combat power in such a situation cannot rationally be consid-
ered justified by military necessary and therefore amounts to the unlawful 
infliction of unnecessary suffering.63 If, it is posited, the enemy operative 
can be totally incapacitated by capture with no additional risk to friendly 
forces, then any harm inflicted in excess of that necessary to capture is ex-
cessive. Armed conflict is, however, a contest between organized belliger-
ent forces, not individual operatives. The authority to use all measures not 
otherwise prohibited by international law to compel the prompt submis-
sion of the enemy is thus not based on an individualized assessment of 
threat. Rather, all attacks are directed towards the enemy in the collective 
sense. Because the law presumes that attacking enemy operatives who 
might otherwise be captured contributes to this collective objective, such 
attacks are indeed justified by military necessity.64  
An essential aspect of military, and in particular combat, operations is 
the goal of seizing and retaining the initiative. This objective always focuses 
on the enemy in the collective sense, a tenet of military operations reflected 
in the concept of operational initiative, defined as the first foundational 
principle of land operations in bedrock U.S. Army doctrine: 
 
To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, Army forces strike the 
enemy, both lethally and nonlethally, in time, places, or manners 
for which the enemy is not prepared. To seize the initiative (set-
                                                                                                                      
62. Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975)[1977] AC 
105, 136–37, (“[T]o kill or seriously wound another person by shooting is prima facie un-
lawful . . . .”). 
63. See Goodman, supra note 7. 
64. See, e.g., Marco Sassóli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Hu-
manitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 599, 606 
(2008) (“Combatants are part of the military potential of the enemy and it is therefore 
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ting and dictating the terms of action), Army forces degrade the 
enemy’s ability to function as a coherent force. Leaders then pre-
vent the enemy’s recovery by retaining the initiative. They follow 
up with a series of actions that destroy enemy capabilities, seize 
decisive terrain, protect populations and critical infrastructure, 
and degrade the coherence of the enemy force. Leaders continue 
to exploit the initiative until they place the enemy in a position 
that disables any ability to coherently employ military capability. 
This continued resistance can only lead to the physical destruc-
tion of the enemy military potential and the exposure of the en-
emy’s sources of power to imminent destruction or capture. 
These are typically the military conditions required for the termi-
nation of a conflict on favorable terms. From the enemy’s point 
of view, U.S. operations must be rapid, unpredictable, and disori-
enting.65 
 
Offensive action and the synchronization and allocation of combat 
power are central to seizing and retaining tactical, operational, and strategic 
initiative. This same doctrinal publication also emphasizes synchronization 
of combat capabilities focused on a totality conception of the enemy: 
 
Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, 
space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power 
at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute 
multiple, related, and mutually supporting tasks in different loca-
tions at the same time, producing greater effects than executing 
each task in isolation. For example, in a tactical action, the syn-
chronization of intelligence collection, obstacles, direct fires, and 
indirect fires results in the destruction of an enemy formation.66 
 
These tenets and associated principles are absolutely central to the doc-
trinal and practical understanding of effective combat operations. Military 
commanders are expected to understand intuitively that imposing their will 
on an enemy requires them to seize and retain the initiative of the battle. 
Force is employed to produce this effect. All allocations of combat power 
must be focused by this principle in order to keep the collective enemy off 
balance so that the friendly commander may dictate the tempo of the fight.  
                                                                                                                      
65. U.S. Department of Army, ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations ¶ 20 (2011) [here-
inafter ADP 3-0]. 








Additional Protocol I’s definition and use of the term “attack”67 is en-
tirely consistent with, and reinforces, this doctrinal principle. Indeed, the 
Commentary notes that “military instruction manuals in many countries de-
fine an attack as an offensive act aimed at destroying enemy forces and 
gaining ground.”68 If an attack is an act to destroy enemy forces, this termi-
nology suggests that the range of such acts must naturally include those 
that kill enemy forces, and therefore the authority to attack includes the 
authority to kill enemy belligerents. 
Commanders are guided by operational tenets and other key principles 
of war when planning and executing combat operations. Lethality is a key 
doctrinal tenet of combat operations, and it involves the synchronized ap-
plication of combat power in all phases of a military campaign, including 
offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This allows commanders to 
concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time in 
order to dictate the terms of the engagement to the enemy. According to 
Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, the U.S. Army’s core warfighting 
doctrine:69 
 
The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other 
military capabilities and the most basic building block for military 
operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their 
formations for unmatched lethality under a wide range of condi-
                                                                                                                      
67. Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I states: “‘Attacks’ means acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” 
68. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 603. The Commentary emphasizes that 
the rules and obligations with regard to attacks encompass defensive attacks as well as 
offensive attacks to ensure that both parties comply with the LOAC regardless of whether 
they are in an offensive or defensive posture at the time. 
69. As noted in this publication: 
 
Unified land operations is the Army’s warfighting doctrine. It is based on the 
central idea that Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a po-
sition of relative advantage over the enemy. This is accomplished through sim-
ultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that set 
conditions for favorable conflict resolution. The Army’s two core competen-
cies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—provide the means for 
balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical ac-
tions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It is the 
integrated application of these two core competencies that enables Army forces 
to defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure 
critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position 
of advantage. 
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tions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organiza-
tions, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of vio-
lence suffices to accomplish the mission through nonlethal en-
gagements and activities. The capability for the lawful and expert 
application of lethal force builds the foundation for effective of-
fensive, defensive, and stability operations.70 
 
These tenets are historically validated, and reflect the military opera-
tional axiom that when an enemy is constantly reacting, and the friendly 
commander can produce intended effects at the decisive points in the bat-
tle, the enemy’s defeat will become inevitable. This process is repeated at 
every level of military operations. As a result, it is often the case that a 
commander will employ overwhelming combat power against an enemy at 
decisive points of the battle, perhaps inflicting mortal casualties on more 
enemy forces than was actually necessary to bring the forces at that point in 
the battle into submission. In other places, enemy forces may fortunately 
be spared based on a determination that economizing the employment of 
combat power against those forces is unnecessary. But, when made, that 
determination of lack of necessity is not based on the conclusion that disa-
bling the individual enemy operatives is unnecessary; rather, it is based on 
the conclusion that the enemy in the collective sense will be brought into 
submission efficiently by allocating the resources necessary to attack those 
forces elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                      
70. Id., ¶ 27. ADP 3-0 replaced the seminal Army doctrinal manual on operations, FM 
3-0. This previous doctrine included reference to classic “principles of war,” including the 
principle of mass, which, like the tenet of lethality, emphasizes the decisive and over-
whelming employment of combat power to seize and retain initiative against a “collective” 
enemy: 
 
Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to 
achieve both destructive and constructive results. . . . Commanders select the 
method that best fits the circumstances. Massed effects overwhelm the entire 
enemy or adversary force before it can react effectively. 
Army forces can mass lethal and nonlethal effects quickly and across large 
distances. This does not imply that they accomplish their missions with massed 
fires alone. Swift and fluid maneuver based on situational understanding com-
plements fires. Often, this combination in a single operation accomplishes what 
formerly took an entire campaign. 
In combat, commanders mass the effects of combat power against a com-
bination of elements critical to the enemy force to shatter its coherence. Some 
effects may be concentrated and vulnerable to operations that mass in both 
time and space. Other effects may be spread throughout depth of the opera-
tional area, vulnerable only to massing effects in time.  
 








Maneuver commanders71 devote a substantial portion of their profes-
sional careers learning how to manage the allocation and application of 
combat power consistent with these principles. Where and when mass is 
called for, there is no hesitation on the amount of force employed based on 
the possible over-breadth of belligerent casualty infliction. Those casualties, 
even if perhaps not necessary in the individual sense, are the necessary cost 
of the calculated leverage of combat power to produce enemy submission 
most efficiently. Analyzing the validity of a least harmful means rule must 
begin with this context, and not with fanciful and far less common hypo-
theticals of enemy soldiers found in the shower or swimming in a lake. Al-
lowing hypotheticals that are operationally unrealistic and attenuated from 
the art of war to dictate the evolution of the law will ultimately undermine 
the law’s perceived validity.  
The goal of attack is always nested within the broader operational and 
strategic objectives of using force, and cannot properly be understood as 
simply neutralizing the individual enemy object of attack. Accordingly, be-
cause attack is always properly understood as initiated to produce a dual 
effect (neutralize the object of attack and negatively influence the enemy 
effort writ large, including the decision-making process of enemy leader-
                                                                                                                      
71. The term “maneuver commander” is commonly used to refer to officers in com-
mand of combat units, or units that are organized and employed to engage in maneuver 
warfare. Combined arms maneuver is the doctrinal method of employing U.S. military 
power, and is defined for the Army by ADP 3-0: 
 
Combined arms maneuver and wide area security provide the means for balanc-
ing the application of the elements of combat power within tactical actions and 
tasks associated with offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Combined 
arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified 
action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; 
and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy 
to seize and exploit the initiative. It exposes enemies to friendly combat power 
from unexpected directions and prevents an effective enemy response. 
 
ADP 3-0, I supra note 68, ¶ 22. Likewise, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publi-
cation on operations includes “movement and maneuver” as a “joint function” and de-
fines it as follows: 
 
This function encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct opera-
tions by securing positional advantages before or during combat operations and 
by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. 
This function includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and 
maneuvering them to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. 
It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces.  
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ship),72 it is impossible to reconcile a least harmful means rule with the un-
derlying tactical, operational, and strategic objectives of military action.  
 
 2. Presumptions, Clarity, Over-breadth and Under-inclusiveness 
 
This contrast between peacetime and armed conflict necessity reveals an 
even more significant distinction between the scope of belligerent attack 
authority and all other justifications for the use of deadly (or any) force: 
only in the armed conflict context does the law permit reliance on a pre-
sumption of threat to justify a use of force. In all other contexts, employing 
force based on such a presumption would be per se unreasonable.73 Thus, 
unlike in the armed conflict context, during peacetime there is never a con-
clusive presumption of necessity to employ force in the form of an attack 
based on status determinations. Rather, the peacetime use of force must 
always be exclusively conduct-based.74 This paradigm ensures the protec-
tion of the objects of state violence from overbroad applications of author-
ity with the accordant arbitrary deprivations of life.75 In armed conflict, the 
collective nature of the enemy belligerent forces justifies a conclusive pre-
sumption that all individuals falling within that status represent a threat jus-
tifying attack. That presumption may at times be factually overbroad, but as 
noted above this is inherent in status-based targeting authority. More im-
portantly, it provides clarity and the space for the type of unhesitating at-
tack initiative that protects friendly forces from the risk that would result 
from ceding the initiative to the enemy.  
This tolerance for launching an attack based solely on a presumption of 
threat—an action that involves methods and means of warfare likely to 
produce death as a first resort—reveals the true inconsistency between the 
core LOAC authority inherent in the principle of military necessity and a 
proposed least harmful means obligation. Like any other rules of presump-
tion,76 status-based attack authority reflects an inherent acceptance of the 
inevitable factual over-breadth such a rule produces. Because application of 
deadly combat power is justified based on status instead of conduct— 
                                                                                                                      
72. See Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Review, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 55, 72–73 n.65 (2005). 
73. See, e.g., Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference, supra note 62. 
74. Parks, supra note 72. 
75. See, e.g., McCann, supra note 30. 
76. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, The Missing Miranda Warning: Why What You Don’t Know 








based on a conclusive presumption that attacking belligerent operatives will 
always contribute to bringing about the submission of the enemy in the 
collective sense—the LOAC permits infliction of death on enemy belliger-
ent operatives irrespective of the actual risk they present at the time of at-
tack unless and until they are no longer capable of executing their belliger-
ent function due to physical incapacity, or they affirmatively disassociate 
themselves from the control of the enemy leadership through surrender.77  
Here, again, is an essential point of emphasis: this attack authority is 
not an obligation. It certainly does not mandate that combatants employ 
the full scope of authority the law grants to subdue an enemy. When, 
where, and how military commanders and their subordinates invoke this 
full scope of authority has always been, and remains, a choice dictated by 
operational considerations. Thus, there have been and will continue to be 
many instances where military forces who may lawfully employ deadly force 
against an enemy choose not to do so, but instead choose to employ a less-
er degree of force to bring the enemy into submission. However, such self-
imposed constraint simply does not indicate the existence of a less harmful 
means obligation; any assertion that it does reveals a misunderstanding of 
the motive that drives such limitations on the use of deadly force. More 
problematically, it presents a genuine risk of distorting the probative effect 
of tactical and operational discretion on the analysis of legal obligation.  
A commander’s assessment that self-imposed limitations on the full 
scope of LOAC attack authority contribute to a tactical, operational, or 
strategic military objective will always be the operational rationale for such 
limitations. In essence, such restraint reflects a militarily driven 
cost/benefit tradeoff. When the commander believes that the military ad-
vantage of imposing such constraint outweighs the advantage of exercising 
the full scope of attack authority, she will make a reasoned choice to sub-
ject her own subordinate forces to increased risk in order to enhance the 
likelihood of mission accomplishment. Commanders always have the pre-
rogative to make such judgments and often do so. The accordant assump-
tion of risk is an inherent aspect of achieving a collective operational objec-
tive, and accepting such risk for the collective objective of mission accom-
plishment is the very nature of military service. For example, consider a 
                                                                                                                      
77. Thus a uniformed military cook holding only a ladle, or an infantry soldier not 
presently holding a weapon, assuming they are not physically incapacitated or surrender-
ing, may be permissibly targeted and killed. At the time of attack they may well present 
little to no risk. Their targeting is permissible because of the conclusive presumption that 




 International Law Studies 2013 
564 
 
unit lying in an ambush position with orders not to fire until the enemy has 
fully entered the kill zone. Individual soldiers are constrained at their own 
personal peril from engaging enemy operatives as they walk right past, but 
this constraint is imposed to achieve the overall collective objective of the 
ambush. A more common example in the context of counter-insurgency 
operations is the use of rules of engagement (ROE)78 to limit tactical and 
operational lethality in favor of strategic restraint, such as limiting the use 
of indirect fires or the conduct of night raids in Afghanistan.79 For exam-
ple, as General Stanley McChrystal’s 2009 Tactical Directive emphasized: 
“the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risk to 
our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But 
excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far 
greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.”80 
                                                                                                                      
78. Rules of engagement are “directives issued by competent military authority that 
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate 
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Apr. 12, 2001, as amended through Sept. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf [hereinafter DoD Dictionary]. See 
DoD Directive 2311.01E, infra note 249. 
79. See, e.g., ISAF Releases, General Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive: Emphasizes 
“Disciplined Use of Force”, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010-08-CA-004, available at 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/general-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-
directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-of-force.html (discussing the emphasis on limiting 
the use of lethal combat power as part of the overall counter-insurgency strategy). 
80. Memorandum from General Stanley McChrystal, Tactical Directive, Afghanistan, 
ISAF Headquarters (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official 
_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf [hereinafter Tactical Directive]. The directive fur-
ther explained:  
 
We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both 
defeat the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the 
number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from 
the center of gravity—the people. That means we must respect and protect the 
population form coercion and violence—and operate in a manner which will 
win their support. 
This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will de-
termine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or 
attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – 
but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive dam-
age and thus alienating the people. 
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational 
issue – clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to ei-











Like all such constraints on otherwise lawful authority, these are imposed 
to enhance the likelihood of mission accomplishment rather than because 
of legal obligation.  
It may be tempting to conclude that requiring some indicia of actual 
threat to justify the necessity for attacking an enemy belligerent with deadly 
combat power is thoroughly consistent with the LOAC’s humanitarian ob-
jective of mitigating the suffering caused by armed conflict. How can mili-
tary necessity permit the killing of enemy personnel whose conduct seems 
relatively non-threatening because of function, isolation, or some combina-
tion of factors indicating de minimis risk associated with capture? Difficult in 
the abstract, this question becomes only more difficult if it is assumed that 
the need to subdue the individual object of attack is the sole basis for at-
tack. But this is not the case. First, as noted above, the objective of all mili-
tary action in armed conflict is achieving enemy submission in the collec-
tive sense. Second, the presumption-based attack authority inherent in the 
concept of military necessity and the rule of military objective inherently 
recognizes such potential factual over-breadth. The LOAC tolerates this 
over-breadth in order to provide the clarity needed to enable armed forces 
to operate in hostile environments with the type of aggressiveness neces-
sary not only to achieve this overall objective, but also to do so while legit-
imately minimizing their own risk. It is precisely because the LOAC pre-
sumes that all members of an enemy force represent a threat sufficient to 
justify the use of deadly force as a means to produce enemy submission 
that this over-breadth exists and is tolerated. In short, because the law in-
cludes enemy belligerent operatives within the category of lawful military 
objectives, the law eliminates any obligation to make individualized assess-
ments of whether each enemy soldier represents an actual threat to the at-
tacking force.  
This over-breadth is offset, however, by the inverse presumption appli-
cable to civilians. Unlike its framework for combatants, the LOAC estab-
lishes a powerful presumption that there is no legitimate necessity to sub-
ject civilians to attack or any other use of deadly force. This presumption is 
based on the fact that civilians are not agents of an enemy belligerent lead-
ership and therefore are normally inoffensive. Both Additional Protocol I 
and Additional Protocol II manifest this presumption in the codification of 
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the deliberate object of attack.81 However, like the belligerent status pre-
sumption of hostility, this presumptive inoffensiveness is not conclusive. 
For the civilian, the presumption is rebutted when and for such time as he 
takes a direct part in hostilities.82 In contrast, and as noted above, the pre-
sumption of threat triggered by belligerent status is rebutted only when the 
belligerent operative is rendered hors de combat by surrender, wounds, or 
sickness.83 This dichotomy is consistent with the difference between the 
status-based attack authority applicable to the belligerent, and the conduct-
based use-of-force authority applicable to the civilian. Use of force against 
a civilian is justified by military necessity only when the soldier identifies 
actual conduct that qualifies as direct participation in hostilities, conduct 
                                                                                                                      
81. See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 598 (“The basic rule of protection 
and distinction is confirmed in this article. It is the foundation on which the codification 
of the laws and customs of war rests: the civilian population and civilian objects must be 
respected and protected in armed conflict, and for this purpose they must be distinguished 
from combatants and military objectives. The entire system established in The Hague in 
1899 and 1907 and in Geneva from 1864 to 1977 is founded on this rule of customary 
law. It was already implicitly recognized in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 re-
nouncing the use of certain projectiles, which had stated that “the only legitimate object 
which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces 
of the enemy.” Admittedly this was concerned with preventing superfluous injury or un-
necessary suffering to combatants by prohibiting the use of all explosive projectiles under 
400 grammes in weight, and was not aimed at specifically protecting the civilian popula-
tion. However, in this instrument the immunity of the population was confirmed indirect-
ly.”). 
82. See id. at 619:  
 
In general the immunity afforded civilians is subject to a very stringent 
condition: that they do not participate directly in hostilities, i.e., that they do not 
become combatants, on pain of losing their protection. Thus “direct” participa-
tion means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actu-
al harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces. It is only 
during such participation that a civilian loses his immunity and becomes a legit-
imate target. Once he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the 
protection under this Section, i.e., against the effects of hostilities, and he may 
no longer be attacked. However, there is nothing to prevent the authorities, 
capturing him in the act or arresting him at a later stage, from taking repressive 
or punitive security measures with regard to him in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 45 (Protection of persons who have taken part in hostilities) or 
on the basis of the provisions of the Fourth Convention (assigned residence, in-
ternment etc.) if his civilian status is recognized. Further it may be noted that 
members of the armed forces feigning civilian non-combatant status are guilty 
of perfidy under Article 37. 
 








that therefore rebuts the presumption of inoffensiveness.84 No such valida-
tion is required to justify attacking an enemy belligerent.  
Attempting to extend a conduct-based least harmful means rule from a 
law enforcement or human rights context into the belligerent targeting 
equation—by asserting that the soldier has an obligation to ensure actual 
conduct justifies attacking the belligerent even when the enemy belligerent 
is still physically functional and has yet to affirmatively separate himself 
from the enemy leadership through surrender—is therefore inconsistent 
with the underlying presumptions upon which attack authority is based. 
The operational clarity these presumptions provide is an essential compo-
nent in developing a warrior ethos.85  
Soldiers are not police officers, and while it is certainly possible to train 
soldiers to operate with the type of restraint incumbent in the police func-
tion,86 asking them to operate under such a framework during armed con-
flict is inconsistent with their fundamental purpose: to be ready, willing, 
and able to employ deadly combat power on demand. Ordering restraint is, 
as noted above, always an option available to a commander who chooses 
not to exercise the full scope of his or her authority against an enemy. 
However, once the law requires that soldiers assess the actual threat an en-
emy combatant poses, the inevitable consequence of a rule that requires 
                                                                                                                      
84. AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(3); see also INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 5. 
85. See 2009 Army Posture Statement, Soldier’s Creed, available at 
http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/soldiers_creed.html (“The Army has 
combined the Soldier's Creed with the Warrior Ethos in order to establish a set of princi-
ples by which every Soldier lives. In a broader sense, the Warrior Ethos is a way of life 
that applies to both our personal and professional lives. They define who we are and who 
we aspire to become.”). The Soldier’s Creed states:  
 
I am an American Soldier. I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve 
the people of the United States and live the Army Values. I will always place the 
mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fall-
en comrade. I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and profi-
cient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment 
and myself. I am an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, en-
gage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat. 
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I am an American 
Soldier. 
 
 Soldier’s Creed, ARMY VALUES, available at http://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html (last 
visited May 2, 2013). 
86. See Mark Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Law-
yering, 143 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1, 90 (1994) (“Although in some operations other than 
war soldiers may feel as if they are policemen, a soldier will never be strictly analogous to a 
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least harmful means based on the absence of an actual threat, the effective-
ness of combat capability risks dilution and tactical clarity will be degrad-
ed.87 
 
III.  THE POSITIVE LAW 
 
The next step to understand the LOAC’s framework with regard to the use 
of force against belligerent operatives—the location for any potential rule 
requiring least harmful means—is to consider how the LOAC’s fundamen-
tal principles are reflected in the positive treaty law. Although Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 provides the most extensive and detailed treaty provi-
sions bearing on the use of force and the constraints on that authority, its 
predecessors also form an important foundation for this analysis, starting 
with the Lieber Code, through the Hague Regulations, and the 1949 Gene-
va Conventions. Together, these early and contemporary LOAC treaties—
the positive law of the LOAC—inform not only the specific provisions of 
                                                                                                                      
87. Soldiers cannot simply “shift” from one use of force framework to another with 
ease. Moving between a law enforcement framework and an armed conflict framework 
requires extensive training to “reset” the warrior mentality. A classic example, used during 
instruction at the U.S. Army JAG School for many years, was an audio tape made by a 
U.S. soldier in a fighting position in Panama on the night of the U.S. intervention in 1989. 
He and his “battle buddy” had been in Panama for several months prior to the invasion. 
During that time, they operated pursuant to restrictive peacetime rules of engagement that 
limited their authority to employ deadly force to situations in which they or other soldiers 
confronted an actual threat of deadly force. That night, their rules of engagement changed 
to “wartime” rules, and once the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were declared hos-
tile, these rules permitted them to employ deadly force against these enemy soldiers based 
on status identification. 
The audiotape recorded the two soldiers observing a PDF soldier moving in the di-
rection of their fighting position. The sound of a Vulcan anti-aircraft gun firing into a 
PDF barracks kept punctuating the recording. One soldier, obviously concerned about the 
approaching PDF soldier, can be heard over and over saying “I swear, if he gets much 
closer I am going to shoot him.” 
This is an example of the confusion produced by subjecting warriors to divergent le-
gal frameworks regulating the employment of force. It is clear that at the time of the audio 
recording the soldier speaking had full authority to engage the PDF soldier he observed 
with deadly force, based on his status as an enemy belligerent. However, he continued to 
assume that his authority was contingent on the manifestation of actual threat—the au-
thority under which he had been operating for the months prior to the conflict. The con-
sequence of this confusion was not only that he and his fellow soldiers were subjected to 
unnecessary risk, but that the opportunity to kill or disable an enemy soldier had been lost, 








Additional Protocol I and how they are interpreted, but also the appropri-
ate understanding of the intention of the drafting parties at the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1974-1977 that produced the Additional Protocols. 
 
A. Early Law: Lieber, Oxford Manual and Hague IV 
 
During the American Civil War, Professor Francis Lieber authored a code 
of rules for the Union forces to follow during the conflict against the Con-
federacy.88 President Abraham Lincoln promulgated this code, now com-
monly known as the Lieber Code, in 1863 as General Order 100, Instructions 
for the Government of Armies of the United States. The Lieber Code represents 
the first attempt to codify and “operationalize” the laws and customs of 
war and establish the basic structure and relationship of the rules governing 
the application of force. 
As explained above, one key distinction between the LOAC and the 
law applicable during peacetime is that during armed conflict, the principle 
of military necessity authorizes the use of deadly combat power as a first 
resort against legitimate targets (as defined by the LOAC). Lieber’s defini-
tion of military necessity is the touchstone from which the modern LOAC 
developed in this area and is therefore an essential pillar in the construction 
of use of force authority against belligerent operatives. The Lieber Code 
articulates the principle of military necessity as consisting “of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and 
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”89 Lieber 
bluntly acknowledged the true and harsh import of military necessity while 
nonetheless qualifying that soldiers in combat continue to be moral beings 
who are accountable for their actions.90  
The Lieber Code’s subsequent articulation of military necessity high-
lights both the breadth of this authority and the inherent incorporation of 
notions of humanity therein: 
                                                                                                                      
88. Lieber Code, supra note 47. 
89. Id., art. 14. Lieber emphasized these two components of military necessity in his 
annotated notes on the Code, writing, “I believe it is necessary to express the ideas of in-
dispensableness and lawfulness. This seems to me very important.” Lieber’s Annotations 
to the Code, on file at the National Archives. 
90. Lieber was no stranger to war’s harsh effects—during the Civil War, two of his 
sons fought on behalf of the Union, another son fought, and died, on behalf of the Con-









Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life 
or limb of “armed” enemies, and of other persons whose de-
struction is incidentally “unavoidable” in the armed contests of 
the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and 
every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of pe-
culiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of proper-
ty, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or 
communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means 
of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an en-
emy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of 
the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking 
of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements en-
tered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war 
to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war 
do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to 
one another and to God.    
 
Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the 
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, 
nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to 
extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any 
way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of de-
ception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military ne-
cessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the re-
turn to peace unnecessarily difficult. 
 
The Lieber Code contains an even more explicit statement of the limits 
on military necessity in Article 71: “[w]hoever intentionally inflicts addi-
tional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, 
or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly 
convicted. . . .”91 Indeed, as the following discussion shows, the parameters 
for the application of deadly combat power against enemy belligerents have 
not changed dramatically from this articulation, demonstrating a remarka-
ble consistency over the past 150 years that only serves to reinforce the 
conclusion that the LOAC does not contain a least harmful means obliga-
tion. 
Eighty-five years after Lieber’s Code was promulgated, the U.S. Mili-
tary Tribunals following World War II offered an even more direct articula-
                                                                                                                      








tion of necessity: “[m]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the 
laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel submission 
of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money.”92 
Neither formulation restricts the amount of force permitted when attacking 
an opposing belligerent as long as there is a rational nexus between the de-
gree of force used to prosecute the attack and compelling the submission 
of the enemy forces—the enemy writ large. As the previous section empha-
sizes, this notion of the enemy as a corporate, collective entity rather than a 
collection of individual threats is integral to the proper understanding and 
application of the principle of military necessity as it was codified in the 
Lieber Code and applied at Nuremberg, and as it continues to be applied 
today. 
The U.S. Army relied on the Lieber Code well into the twentieth centu-
ry. More significantly, the Lieber Code was the starting point for several 
nineteenth century international conventions codifying the laws and cus-
toms of war. Like the Lieber Code, none of these subsequent foundational 
expressions of the LOAC included a least restrictive means requirement. 
The initial example is the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, the first interna-
tional treaty in which States parties renounced the use of a particularly per-
nicious means of warfare (certain explosive projectiles) for the purpose of 
minimizing unnecessary suffering of belligerents. The Declaration’s preamble, 
which has served as a foundation of the LOAC since 1868, declared: 
 
The only legitimate object which States should endeavor to ac-
complish during war is to weaken the military forces of the ene-
my; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest 
possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded by 
the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings 
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable.93 
 
At the time, these statements were directly linked to the purpose for 
which the states signing the St. Petersburg Declaration were convened—to 
limit the use of weapons, indeed one weapon in particular, that they con-
cluded by consensus caused unnecessary suffering. For example, according 
to one description of the exploding projectile banned in 1868, the “blast 
itself [from the weapon] resulted in a serious wound, but the expanding 
gases and the scattering of fragments from the casing aggravated the condi-
                                                                                                                      
92. United States v. Wilhelm List et al., XI TWC 1253 (1948). 
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tion of the victim, who inevitably died in agony.”94 Thus, as this purpose 
demonstrates, the limitations sought and agreed upon were not limits on 
attacking the enemy with deadly combat power, but on the use of particular 
means of deadly force (i.e., particular weapons) that in addition to creating 
a high probability of death (a characteristic of virtually all weapons and 
ammunition developed for armed hostilities and provided to armed forces), 
also resulted in suffering considered superfluous to that necessary to effi-
ciently disable the object of attack and, therefore, beyond that justified by 
military necessity. 
Two additional and important LOAC documents followed soon after 
the St. Petersburg Declaration: the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford 
Manual. Neither of these took the form of treaties, so they did not impose 
positive binding obligations on states. Rather, they are best understood as 
statements of best practices in the field of conflict regulation and are con-
sidered essential historical sources for interpreting the meaning of the con-
temporary LOAC. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 pronounced that “the 
laws of war do not recognize an unlimited power in the adoption of means 
of injuring” the enemy.95 It is significant, however, that in listing re-
strictions on the means of injuring the enemy, the Brussels Declaration did 
not set forth any restriction on killing the enemy when capture was a feasi-
ble alternate disabling option.96 Instead, consistent with the St. Petersburg 
Declaration, it focused on certain especially pernicious weapons (such as 
poisoned weapons) and certain attacks against an enemy traditionally con-
                                                                                                                      
94. Hans-Peter Gasser, A Look at the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, 33 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 509, 512 (1993). 
95. Brussels Declaration, Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War, art. 12 (Aug. 27, 1874), http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Arti 
cle.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1D6CAC9F1AFBF559C12563CD0051553
E.  
96. See id, art. 13: 
 
According to this principle are especially forbidden: (a) Employment of 
poison or poisoned weapons; (b) Murder by treachery of individuals belonging 
to the hostile nation or army; (c) Murder of an enemy who, having laid down 
his arms or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; 
(d) The declaration that no quarter will be given; (e) The employment of arms, 
projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, as well as the 
use of projectiles prohibited by the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868; (f) 
Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military in-
signia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Gene-
va Convention; (g) Any destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property that is 









sidered inconsistent with chivalrous custom (such as the prohibition on 
denial of quarter, murder by treachery, or killing an enemy who surren-
dered). These limitations on attack authority, and the Brussels Declaration 
writ large, provided the basis for an even more comprehensive statement 
of best practices: the Manual of the Laws and Customs of War adopted in 
Oxford, England in 1880, which reiterated these limitations.97  
It was not until the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and their ac-
companying Regulations, therefore, that a comprehensive set of rules to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities took the form of a binding multi-lateral 
international convention.98 Building on these prior efforts, the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV included regulations for the conduct of hostilities that were 
annexed to the treaty. These regulations included rules governing the 
means of injuring the enemy, rules that are today regarded as foundational 
principles of the law. Among the most important are Article 22, which 
states that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy 
is not unlimited,”99 and Article 23, which provides that “[i]n addition to the 
prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . 
(e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering.”100 This rule against weapons and systems calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering is a specific prohibition that qualifies but does not 
supplant the broad grant of authority under military necessity to use any 
amount of force to subdue the enemy. Moreover, that prohibition places 
limitations on the use of force that causes unnecessary suffering. It does not 
include, and thus does not proscribe, the use of force to kill a belligerent. 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions also included prohibitions on at-
tacking an enemy who has surrendered and on the denial of quarter,101 af-
firming the prohibitions first delineated in the Brussels Declaration and 
Oxford Manual. Like the restrictions on the use of weapons that cause un-
necessary suffering, these prohibitions remain central components of the 
protections for belligerents during armed conflict. 
 
                                                                                                                      
97. The Laws of War on Land, Sept. 9, 1880, available at http://www.icrc. 
org/ihl/INTRO/140?OpenDocument (commonly referred to as “The Oxford Manual”). 
The Oxford Manual addressed many of the same subjects as the Brussels Declaration, 
although using different language.  
98. Hague IV, supra note 54, pmbl. 
99. Id., art. 22 
100. Id., art. 23. 
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B. Geneva Law  
 
Unlike the focus on regulating means and methods of warfare that 
developed through the Hague Conventions, the focus of the Geneva 
Conventions, from their inception in 1864 through the promulgation of the 
current Conventions in 1949, was and remains almost exclusively the 
protection of victims of war—individuals who were not or are no longer 
active participants in hostilities (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of 
war, civilians subject to enemy control).102 Considering the clear 
humanitarian foundation and focus of these treaties, it is worth noting that 
there is absolutely no reference to or support for the assertion of a least 
harmful means obligation applicable to pre-submission belligerents. It also 
seems significant that the humane treatment obligation established by 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies, inter 
alia, to belligerent operatives in non-international armed conflict only after 
they are no longer “actively” involved in hostilities, which is indicated by 
the following language: “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . . . .”103 According to 
the associated Commentary, these are individuals who “have laid down their 
arms or have been placed hors de combat.”104 The drafting history of 
Common Article 3 shows that it is almost self-evident that this concept 
was understood as analogous to the concept of hors de combat applicable in 
international armed conflicts.  
First, several of the original proposals suggested extending prisoner of 
war protections to members of belligerent groups in non-international 
armed conflicts.105 Although these proposals were rejected, it seems clear 
that the humane treatment protection was understood as applying only af-
ter an individual belligerent operative surrendered or was physically disa-
bled and taken into custody by a detaining force, which is the identical trig-
ger for prisoner of war status. Indeed, the Commentary appears to confirm 
this when explaining the terminology ultimately agreed upon: 
 
                                                                                                                      
102. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949, at 19–33 (1995).  
103. Common Article 3, supra note 18. 
104. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 40. 








Taken literally, the phrase “including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms” can be interpreted (in the 
French version) in one of two ways, depending on whether the 
words “who have laid down their arms” are taken as referring to 
“members” or “armed forces”. The discussions at the Confer-
ence brought out clearly that it is not necessary for an armed 
force as a whole to have laid down its arms for its members to be 
entitled to protection under this Article. The Convention refers 
to individuals and not to units of troops, and a man who has surren-
dered individually is entitled to the same humane treatment as he would re-
ceive if the whole army to which he belongs had capitulated. The important 
thing is that the man in question will be taking no further part in 
the fighting.106 
 
The use of the term “will” in the “no further part in the fighting” sentence 
indicates a conclusive condition, and not an anticipated condition. In other 
words, it is not until the opponent is incapacitated by submission to friend-
ly forces, or by physical wounds or sickness, that he “will be taking no fur-
ther part in hostilities.” 
Second, the dual nature of the conditions that trigger the humane 
treatment obligation, which focus on what appears to be synonymous with 
surrender (laid down their arms) or incapacitation by wounds or sickness 
(hors de combat) is telling. Just as the absence of any mention in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions of a class of individuals entitled to a least harmful 
means rule demonstrates that no such category existed or was contemplat-
ed, so the formulation of the triggers for the humane treatment obligation 
indicate that even in the context of the Geneva tradition, states have never 
recognized a least harmful means obligation applicable to belligerents. 
 
C. Additional Protocol I 
 
Derived from the humanitarian tradition of the Geneva Conventions, and 
updating and merging means and methods rules from the Hague tradition 
with Geneva’s humanitarian tradition, Additional Protocol I established the 
most comprehensive positive rules providing both the authority to attack 
lawful targets and the limitations on that authority. As this section demon-
strates, those limitations do not include a least harmful means obligation 
when targeting (attacking) belligerents. Given the specific and heavily em-
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phasized humanitarian focus of Additional Protocol I, the absence of such 
a limitation on lawful attack authority is particularly significant. Indeed, the 
authors believe the proposed least harmful means rule could credibly be 
rejected based solely on the absence of such a limitation in a treaty so heav-
ily devoted to imposing humanitarian-based limitations on the use of com-
bat power.107  
 
1. AP I’s Humanitarian Emphasis  
  
Additional Protocol I is traditionally viewed as the consolidation of the law 
of Geneva (the Geneva Conventions from 1864 to 1949 focused on the 
protection of war victims) and the law of The Hague (the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions focused on the means and methods of warfare and the 
conduct of belligerents). As the International Court of Justice explained in 
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,    
                                                                                                                      
107. Interestingly, Professor Goodman appears to have significantly constricted his 
assertion of a least harmful means rule, recently arguing that,  
 
[t]he law forbids, in some circumstances, killing an enemy fighter when doing 
so is manifestly [unnecessary]—for instance, when capture is equally effective 
and does not endanger the attacking party’s armed forces. That prohibition is 
the Law of the Protocol: unnecessary killing is a form of ‘superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering’ under Article 35(2).  
 
Robert Chesney, The Capture-or-Kill Debate #10: Goodman Responds to Heller, LAWFARE: 
HARD NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com 
/2013/03/the-capture-or-kill-debate-10-goodman-responds-to-heller/. (This stands in 
stark contrast to his initial statement of the rule: “The international rules of warfare re-
quire nations to capture instead of kill enemy fighters, especially when lethal force is not 
the only way to take them off the battlefield.”). Ryan Goodman, The Lesser Evil: What the 
Obama Administration isn’t Telling You About Drones. The Standard Rule is Capture, Not Kill, 
SLATE.COM, Feb. 19, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ jurispru-
dence/2013/02/the_obama_administration_and_drones_the_rule_of_law_is_capture_ 
not_kill.html. It is apparent from this article that we strongly disagree with any claim that 
such a “law of the Protocol” exists. In addition, such a phrase is an odd way to character-
ize a rule originally asserted as a default obligation applicable to the United States. We 
disagree that even Additional Protocol I imposes such a rule. However, even assuming, 
arguendo, that such a rule can be properly characterized as “the law of the Protocol,” it 
would not bind states not parties to Additional Protocol I, most notably the United States. 
Proponents have also failed to demonstrate that such a rule should be considered custom-
ary international law, a conclusion that seems conceded by the “law of the Protocol” char-
acterization. To this end, it is highly relevant that no country that has engaged in armed 
conflict since Additional Protocol I entered into force has recognized a legal obligation to 
use least harmful means, providing almost insurmountable support for the negative—such 









[These] two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict 
have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to 
have gradually formed one single complex system today as inter-
national humanitarian law. The provisions of the Additional Pro-
tocols of 1977 give expression and attest to the unity of that 
law.108  
 
The drafters of Additional Protocol I also saw the treaty as the essential 
next step in the inexorable process of “reliev[ing] the sufferings of the vic-
tims of war.”109 On the first day of the Diplomatic Conference, the Acting 
President of the conference highlighted the important work of developing 
and codifying the laws of war since the time of Henri Dunant, but empha-
sized that: 
 
[T]he work which had been going on for a century, which did 
honour to the whole international community and testified to an 
increasingly clear realization of the need to give better protection 
to the human person, was unfortunately still unfinished, since the 
continual recurrence of violence and the constant development 
of new armaments had led to an extension of human suffering.110 
  
That need to continue to develop and bolster the law applicable during 
armed conflict was the driving force behind the Additional Protocols. In 
essence, although saving the world from the “scourge of war” might not be 
possible, “the participants in the Conference at least had the power to 
make war less implacable and less indiscriminate, and to reach an agree-
ment that would be instrumental in relieving much terrible suffering, in 
sparing innocent lives and in giving better protection to the weak.”111 
Additional Protocol I provides the most extensive humanitarian protec-
tions codified in the LOAC to the present day, most notably the detailed 
catalog of protections for civilians during hostilities. These protections ap-
pear in Section I of Part IV of the treaty, entitled “General Protection 
                                                                                                                      
108. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 20, ¶ 75. 
109. Federal Political Department, V Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflict, Geneva (1974–1977), at 7 (1978) [hereinafter Official Records]. 
110. Id. at 8, ¶ 4. 
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Against Effects of Hostilities” and include the principle of distinction,112 
prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks,113 the principle of proportionality,114 
the protection of cultural objects and places of worship,115 the protection 
of objects indispensable to the civilian population,116 the protection of the 
natural environment,117 and a prohibition on attacking objects containing 
dangerous forces.118 These and other prohibitions on the means and meth-
ods of warfare demonstrate Additional Protocol I’s principal humanitarian 
focus vis-à-vis the employment of combat power: civilians. As the Commen-
tary explains, this section “obviously represents the crowning achievement 
of the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977 and the most significant victo-
ry achieved in international humanitarian law”119 since the adoption of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (devoted exclusively to the protection of civil-
ian victims of war) in 1949.  
Both the ICRC (which initiated and convened the Diplomatic Confer-
ence that produced Additional Protocol I) and the negotiating state parties 
saw an equally important need to update the law of The Hague, which was 
not the subject of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and “had not undergone 
any significant revision since 1907.”120 Laws regulating the means and 
methods of warfare and the conduct of belligerents also fulfill the LOAC’s 
humanitarian purpose by safeguarding participants in armed conflict from 
unnecessary suffering and cruel treatment. In this regard, and particularly 
because this component of Additional Protocol I forms the backdrop for 
the legal analysis of any potential least harmful means rule, it is important 
to emphasize that the provisions codified in Additional Protocol I repre-
sented the consensus view of the negotiating parties and the incorporation 





                                                                                                                      
112. AP I, supra note 2, arts. 51, 52. 
113. Id., art. 51. 
114. Id., arts. 51, 57. 
115. Id., art. 53. 
116. Id., art. 54. 
117. Id., art. 55. 
118. Id., art. 56. 
119. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 583. 
120. Id. at xxix. 








 2. Protections for Civilians from the Effects of Attacks: In Brief 
 
As noted above, Additional Protocol I implements the cardinal LOAC 
principle of distinction, obligating belligerents to distinguish between law-
ful objects of attack and all other persons, places, and things on the battle-
field. Thus, belligerents may only deliberately direct force against lawful 
objects of attacks. These obligations reflect the humanitarian focus of Ad-
ditional Protocol I; civilians and civilian property are protected from delib-
erate attack because the application of combat power is restricted to targets 
that contribute to the submission of an opponent’s military capability, or 
military objectives.  
The principle of proportionality set forth in Additional Protocol I, ex-
plained in Section I above, bolsters the conclusion that protecting belliger-
ents with a least harmful means rule is not mandated or introduced by the 
Protocol’s humanitarian focus. Proportionality focuses on civilians who 
may be the potential victims of incidental injury from otherwise lawful at-
tacks between and against belligerents. But civilians are the exclusive bene-
ficiaries of the rule’s protections. Proportionality protection is simply inap-
plicable to the intended lawful object of attack—belligerents.122  Thus, 
“[p]roportionality in relation to the military advantage anticipated is inextri-
cably linked to the topic of collateral damage to civilians (and civilian ob-
jects) expected from attacks against lawful targets and has nothing to do 
with injury or suffering sustained by combatants.”123 To that end, the pro-
portionality rule is but one part of a broader mosaic of rules in Additional 
Protocol I that function to limit targeting authority with the specific and 
common purpose of protecting civilians. The notable absence of a parallel 
rule of proportionality applicable to belligerents is clear indication of the 
shared view of Additional Protocol I’s drafters and signatories that no such 
limitation exists.124 
                                                                                                                      
122. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 5, 40 (2010). 
123. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 65. 
124. Much attention has been focused on the statements of a leading commentator 
on the LOAC and former vice president of the ICRC, Jean Pictet, that “if a combatant can 
be put out of action by taking him prisoner, he should not be injured; and if he can be put 
of action by light injury, grave injury should be avoided.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS, WEAPONS THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE 
INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS: REPORT ON THE WORK OF EXPERTS 13 (1973). Simply put, 
Pictet’s view could have been, but was not, codified in AP I. Pictet’s statement reflects a 
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Finally, the LOAC mandates that all parties take certain precautionary 
measures to protect civilians, another foundational component of the pro-
tection of civilians and an equally important marker of the distinction be-
tween the protections for civilians and for belligerents. In accordance with 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, parties launching attacks must ensure 
that targets are military objectives, refrain from indiscriminate attacks (in-
cluding those violating the principle of proportionality), choose means and 
methods of warfare offering the least harm to civilians, choose the military 
objective offering the least harm to civilians when two objectives offer sim-
ilar military gain, and provide effective advance warning, where feasible, of 
attacks that may affect the civilian population.125 Like the protections in-
herent in the principle of proportionality, the protections mandated by Ar-
ticle 57’s obligations to take precautions are focused solely on civilians, ci-
vilian property and the civilian population. Precautions are essential to the 
fulfillment of Additional Protocol I’s humanitarian goals—namely, protec-
tion of civilians—because “the effective implementation of the safeguard 
principles expressed in the Protocol largely depends on [compliance with 
these precautionary obligations].”126  
  
3.  Affirmative Prohibitions on the Use of Lethal Force 
 
Given Additional Protocol I’s humanitarian focus, it is unsurprising that 
the treaty outlines specific constraints on the use of force, such as those 
noted briefly above. Any analysis of Additional Protocol I’s restraints on 
and parameters for the use of force must therefore start with the specific 
principles and obligations that the treaty sets forth. In addition, it is im-
portant to note the difference between protections mandated with regard 
to civilian persons and protections for belligerent enemy personnel.127 The 
proscriptions noted above—prohibitions against targeting civilians, attack-
ing cultural objects, et cetera—are aimed directly at the protection of indi-
vidual civilians and the civilian population. Although these rules lie at the 
heart of Additional Protocol I’s humanitarian goals and framework, they do 
                                                                                                                      
But the statement must be identified for what it was—and remains—which is lex ferenda 
and not lex lata.  
125. AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(i), 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), 57(2)(c), 
57(3). 
126. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 680. 
127. Indeed, these two separate sets of protections are located in separate sections of 








not apply to the use of force against or the treatment of belligerent person-
nel or military objectives. Invoking these rules to assert a broader least 
harmful means obligation that extends to belligerent operatives is therefore 
inconsistent with the very framework of the treaty.  
Indeed, the provisions of Additional Protocol I clearly delineate be-
tween the beneficiaries of various protections, whether civilian or belliger-
ent. The very obligation at the heart of the principle of distinction mani-
fests this essential framework. Although the protective aspects that flow 
from the principle of distinction are critically significant, “no less important 
is the corresponding exposure to attack of combatants and military objec-
tives.”128 
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I defines military objectives as “those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi-
nite military advantage.”129 Certainly there can be debate as to the qualifica-
tion of certain objects, but it is without question that members of belliger-
ent armed forces are per se military objectives and thus legitimate targets. 
As noted in the Commentary to Article 52,  
 
[t]he definition of [military objective] is limited to objects but it is 
clear that members of the armed forces are military objectives, 
for, as the Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg states: 
“the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to ac-
complish during war is to weaken the military forces of the ene-
my; [...] for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest 
possible number of men”.130 
 
The Commentary to Article 43, the first treaty definition of combatant,131 
also reinforces the legality of attacking belligerents with deadly combat 
power: “it should be explicitly stated that all members of the armed forces 
[with the exception of medical and similar non-combatant members] can 
                                                                                                                      
128. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 89. 
129. AP I, supra note 2, art. 52(2). 
130. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 635. 
131. Article 43(1) provides that “[t]he Armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of 
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to 
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a gov-
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participate directly in hostilities, i.e. attack and be attacked.”132 The word 
“attack” is subsequently defined in Additional Protocol I as “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”133 Nowhere 
is the definition of “attack” limited to a certain measure of force, specific 
operational contexts, or specific conditions of the belligerent operative. In 
short, nothing in the meaning of the concept of attack supports a least 
harmful means limitation on the measure of such acts of violence. In fact, 
the Commentary explicitly indicates that “it refers to the use of arms with the 
intent of deliberately killing or wounding the enemy.”134 As a result, it is 
wholly inconsistent with the positive LOAC to interpret the authority to 
attack as limited to only injuring or disabling the enemy rather than killing.  
This section thus analyzes the express prohibitions on the use of force 
that Additional Protocol I sets forth with regard to enemy belligerents—in 
contrast to the protections for civilians mentioned above. These affirmative 
prohibitions include the protection for those who are hors de combat, limita-
tions on the means and methods of warfare, the prohibition of the denial 
of quarter, and constraints on the use of force against escaping prisoners.  
 
a.  Hors de Combat 
 
The notion of hors de combat is central to the LOAC’s core purpose of min-
imizing suffering during armed conflict. As the Commentary notes, “one 
might argue that the whole secret of the law of war lies in the respect for a 
disarmed man.”135 Proponents of a least harmful means obligation often 
argue that such a rule falls within a broad conception of hors de combat, in 
addition to or as an alternative to a separate obligation to use the least 
harmful means.136 For that reason, analysis of the meaning of hors de combat 
provides useful illumination for the debate over the parameters for the use 
of deadly combat power against belligerents.137 
                                                                                                                      
132. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 515. 
133. AP I, supra note 2, art. 49(1). 
134. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 482. 
135. Id. at 480. 
136. See generally a string of blogs debating the issue on LAWFARE: HARD NATIONAL 
SECURITY CHOICES between the current authors, Kevin Heller, Jens Ohlin, and Ryan 
Goodman, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/the-capture-or-kill-debate-11-good 
man-responds-to-ohlin/ (last visited May 2, 2013); Chesney, supra note 107.  
137. For an excellent analysis of the application of Article 41 of Additional Protocol I 
and the doctrine of hors de combat, see MICHAEL BOTHE , KARL JOSEF PARTSCH 








Building on the framework established in the Hague Regulations and 
other foundational LOAC sources, the ICRC draft that was the basis for 
the negotiations at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference contained a pro-
vision concerning attacks on persons who are out of combat, or hors de com-
bat. Originally proposed as Article 38,138 the provisions on persons who are 
hors de combat went through numerous amendments139 and were considered 
by both Committee One and Committee Three.140 The provision was even-
tually divided into two separate articles and the portion focused on persons 
who are hors de combat became Article 41. 
Article 41 of Additional Protocol I is derived from Article 23 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations (discussed above)141 and the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions,142 but expands the application. Article 23 applied only to surren-
                                                                                                                      
ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 
at 218–24 (1982);  IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 83–97 
(2009). 
138. The originally proposed version by the ICRC, draft Article 38, stated:  
 
1. It is forbidden to kill, injure, ill-treat or torture an enemy hors de combat. 
An enemy hors de combat is one who, having laid down his arms, no longer has 
any means of defence or has surrendered. These conditions are considered to 
have been fulfilled, in particular, in the case of an adversary who: 
(a) is unable to express himself, or 
(b) has surrendered or has clearly expressed an intention to surrender, 
(c) and abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape. 
2. Any Party to the conflict is free to send back to the adverse Party those 
combatants it does not wish to hold as prisoners, after ensuring that they are in 
a fit state to make the journey without any danger to their safety. 
3. It is forbidden to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an 
adversary therewith and to conduct hostilities on such basis.  
 
I Official Records, supra note 109, pt. III, at 13. 
 
139. Id. at III Official Records 169–71. 
140. Id. at XIV Official Records, CDDH/III/SR 1, at 7. The Diplomatic Conference 
split into three Committees for the task of negotiating and adopting the component parts 
of the Additional Protocols. Committee One addressed general and final provisions, those 
on execution in Protocol I and those on fundamental guarantees in Protocol II; and 
Committee Three was assigned means and methods of warfare and the protection of the 
civilian population. BOTHE, supra note 137, at 4. 
141. Hague IV, supra note 54, art. 23(c) provides that it is forbidden “[t]o kill or 
wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, 
has surrendered at discretion.” 
142. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, 1 Bevans 516, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/180?OpenDocument; GC III, GC IV; XIV Official 
Records, supra note 109, CDDH/III/SR.29, at 276 ¶¶  30–31; PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, 
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der, and listed laying down arms as one aspect of demonstrating surrender. 
In contrast, Article 41 expands the defined descriptions of those who are 
hors de combat in two important ways: first, it extends the coverage of those 
who can be considered hors de combat to more than combatants belonging to 
a declared “enemy,” and second, it includes within the definition of hors de 
combat more than merely those who have surrendered.  
With regard to the first expansion, although the heading of Article 41 is 
“Safeguard of an enemy hors de combat,”143 the text of the provision is not 
limited to “an enemy.” Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations specifically 
provides protections to the “enemy.”144 Article 41 of Additional Protocol I 
goes beyond that characterization and states that “[a] person who is recog-
nized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de com-
bat shall not be made the object of attack.”145 The use of the term “person” 
as opposed to “enemy” was deliberate.146 As discussed in the Commentary, 
“this change was designed to make clear that what was forbidden was the 
deliberate attack against persons hors de combat.”147 Article 41 thus manifests 
the recognition that more than just those officially declared as an enemy, 
such as civilians who are directly participating in hostilities and irregular 
fighters, can become hors de combat and benefit from these protections.148  
With regard to the second expansion, Article 41 broadens the meaning 
of hors de combat beyond surrender. Article 23(c) of the 1907 Hague Con-
vention149 applies to those who surrender and lists having laid down one’s 
arms or no longer having a means of defense as apparent indicators for an 
attacker to use as support for the affirmative desire to surrender by a com-
batant. Under that provision, once an enemy had clearly demonstrated his 
intent to surrender, an attacker was obligated to accept that surrender.150 
                                                                                                                      
143. AP I, supra note 2, art. 41. 
144. Hague IV, supra note 54, art. 23(c). 
145. AP I, supra note 2, art. 41(1). 
146. See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 482 (“Perhaps it is because a per-
son hors de combat can no longer be considered as an enemy that the Conference has also 
abandoned here the terminology of Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations in favour of 
the word ‘person’ . . . .”). 
147. Id. 
148. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 483 (“The rule protects both regular 
combatants and those combatants who are considered to be irregular, both those whose 
status seems unclear and ordinary civilians. There are no exceptions and respect for the 
rule is also imposed on the civilian population, who should, like the combatants, respect 
persons hors de combat.”). 
149. Hague IV, supra note 54, art. 23(c). 








Article 41(1) of Additional Protocol I reaffirmed that attacking those who 
are hors de combat is prohibited, but then, in Article 41(2), expands the hors de 
combat categories beyond those listed in Hague IV. Although surrender re-
mains explicitly applicable, Article 41(2)(b) states that a person is also hors 
de combat if “he clearly expresses an intention to surrender.”151 The doctrine 
of surrender is a part of customary law and was never questioned during 
the negotiations.  
Article 41’s expanded list also includes those “in the power of an Ad-
verse Party” and those incapable of defending themselves due to physical 
incapacity.152 The Commentary demonstrates that this expansion is, in effect, 
merely a consolidation of existing protections for wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked (as referenced in Article 10 of Additional Protocol I) and the pro-
tection for those who “no longer [have] the means of defence,” which 
dates back to the 1907 Hague Regulations.153 Most important, the Commen-
tary emphasizes that hors de combat is just that—“out of the fight”—and that 
an enemy operative who can still present a threat, even if wounded or sick, 
does not fall within the definition of hors de combat. Thus, the Commentary 
states, “there is no obligation to abstain from attacking a wounded or sick 
person who is preparing to fire, or who is actually firing, regardless of the 
severity of his wounds or sickness.”154 This telling statement serves as an 
important reminder of a fundamental premise of military operations during 
armed conflict: the enemy is presumed hostile and offensive until such pre-





                                                                                                                      
151. AP I, art. 41(2)(b); see PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 487 (“If the in-
tention to surrender is indicated in an absolutely clear manner, the adversary must cease 
fire immediately; it is prohibited to refuse unconditional surrender.”). 
152. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 41(2)(c) (including in the definition of hors de combat a 
person who “has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or 
sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself”). 
153. Hague IV, supra note 54, art. 23(c). See also PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 
9, at 488 (“In fact, it is not only because a person of the adverse Party is wounded, or par-
tially handicapped, that this obligation arises, but because he is incapable of defending 
himself. In this respect, the text goes back to the wording of Article 23(c) of the Hague 
Regulations, which prohibits especially the killing or wounding of an enemy who no long-
er has the means of defence.”). 
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i. “in the power of” 
 
The states who negotiated Additional Protocol I amended the ICRC’s pro-
posed definition of persons who qualified as hors de combat in several 
ways.155 One of the most obvious was the desire to combine the Third Ge-
neva Convention’s reference to persons “who have fallen into the power of 
the enemy”156 with those who surrender and might otherwise be hors de com-
bat. In doing so, the negotiating nations changed the language to cover 
those who are “in the power of an Adverse Party.”157 The purpose of the 
chosen language was to be more inclusive, and to incorporate situations in 
which a person might not yet have the opportunity to surrender but might 
have no means of defense.158  
With regard to who could be considered hors de combat, the ICRC repre-
sentative at the Diplomatic Conference explained that  
 
[t]he determining factor [in determining who was hors de combat] 
was abstention from hostile acts of any kind, either because the 
means of combat were lacking or because the person in question 
had laid down his arms. It was therefore necessary that there 
should be an objective cause, the destruction of means of com-
bat, or a subjective cause, surrender.159  
 
The representative from Uruguay then elaborated, stating, “[i]n view of re-
cent events, it was clear that if an enemy was hors de combat, it was because 
he had laid down his arms and had thereby lost his status as a combat-
ant.”160 When confronted with an enemy, that individual was no longer able 
or did not have the will to conduct combat and therefore was hors de combat. 
The Brazilian representative echoed this understanding: “An enemy was 
                                                                                                                      
155. See notes 143–52 supra and accompanying text. 
156. GC III, supra note 17, art. 4. 
157. AP I, supra note 2, art. 41(2). See also PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 
484–85. As a drafting note, the other place where Additional Protocol I uses the words “in 
the power” is Section III (and references to it), addressing civilian treatment during occu-
pation. Although no clear tie between the use of these exact words within the Official 
Records is apparent, it seems appropriate to assume that using those same words in both 
places was meant to mean similar levels of control when determining who is “in the pow-
er” of an adversary. 
158. XIV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/III/SR.29, at 278 ¶ 4 & 284 ¶ 75; 
PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 481. 
159. XIV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/III.SR.29, at 276 ¶ 30. 








hors de combat when he no longer had any possibility of defending himself or 
when he had surrendered.”161 The lack of either will (manifested by the af-
firmative act of surrender) or capability (manifested by disabling wounds or 
sickness) thus form necessary elements of a person being “in the power of” 
an adversary. In addition, as discussed below, it is important to consider 
these comments in the context of who bears the burden in the determina-
tion of whether someone is hors de combat. 
Proponents of a least harmful means obligation appear to nest their as-
serted rule within a broad conception of the term “in the power of” in Ar-
ticle 41 of Additional Protocol I. They posit the question, “if an enemy bel-
ligerent is surrounded by an overwhelming number of friendly forces, and 
he can be subdued with no meaningful risk to those forces, isn’t he func-
tionally ‘in their power’ and therefore hors de combat?”162 We believe that the 
positive LOAC and the intent of the drafters, as exemplified in the Commen-
tary’s reminder that an enemy who is preparing to fire, can still fire, or is 
still firing, regardless of the hopelessness of his situation, is not hors de com-
bat, affirm that the answer to this question remains “no” and the historical 
foundation for the inclusion of the term “in the power of” rebuts their as-
sertion.  
Not only do neither the Protocol itself nor the travaux préparatoires re-
flect such a broad conception of “in the power of”, but such an argument 
actually further detracts from any proposed least harmful means rule. The 
very argument that a least harmful means obligation exists only pursuant to 
an expansive interpretation of “in the power” means that it certainly does 
not exist as an accepted LOAC rule, but rather at best as an aspirational 
constraint on belligerent targeting derived from a tactically incoherent in-
terpretation of a LOAC concept whose meaning has been settled for cen-
turies. Conflating the two concepts represents an unfortunate misunder-
standing of both the LOAC and the meaning of “in the power of.”163 In 
                                                                                                                      
161. Id. at 276 ¶ 34. 
162. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 7. 
163. For example, proponents of a least harmful means rule often rely on the follow-
ing statement by Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld to support the existence of an 
obligation to use least harmful means: 
 
Admittedly, no treaty rule lays down in express terms that an enemy cannot be 
killed if they could be taken prisoner instead. But neither is there solid ground 
for the assertion that an enemy ‘has surrendered’ (and, hence, can no longer be 
killed) only from the moment their capture has been formally completed. If not 
against the terms, the argument goes against the spirit of Article 23(c-d) and, 
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addition, it assumes that Additional Protocol I’s slight expansion from 
“surrender” to “in the power of”164 provides fodder for an infinite expan-
sion of “in the power” to impose an obligation to constantly assess wheth-
er an enemy belligerent who is not actively firing or preparing to fire 
should no longer be considered capable of acting pursuant to the dictates 
of enemy belligerent leadership, action that is the duty of every soldier. 
These arguments are simply inconsistent with the LOAC and misunder-
stand the fundamental conclusion of the Protocol drafters—that clarity and 
“implementability” must and do outweigh any potential rule that is based 
on no more than “maybe” as its foundation for split-second decision-
making in the course of combat.165 
 
ii. The burden to establish “hors de combat” 
 
An essential underlying foundation to Article 41 is the presumption that a 
combatant is targetable based on his status. Though it is conceivable that 
this status-based attack authority may in some rare circumstances result in a 
factually overbroad application of combat power, it is a necessary presump-
tion to the conduct of hostilities. Although often viewed solely as identify-
ing who can be attacked and when, Article 41 essentially provides infor-
                                                                                                                      
to protect human life and ward off unnecessary human suffering; or, in terms of 
the Martens clause, against the notion of ‘the protection and the rule of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience’. 
 
KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 3, at 98. However, what this statement does is to (1) 
highlight that there is no rule in the LOAC creating a least harmful means obligation, and 
(2) specifically place any urging to use less harmful means within the concept of “in the 
power”—and only within a very narrowly expanded conception of “in the power” that 
tracks quite closely the interpretation set forth in AP I and in the Commentary. The asser-
tion that “formal capture” is not the only trigger for “in the power” is exactly what the 
drafters of AP I had in mind, as noted in the text above, and therefore this and similar 
statements simply highlight the development of the definition of hors de combat between 
Hague IV and AP I and do not support the existence of a least harmful means obligation 
as a LOAC rule. 
164. See notes 156–61 supra and accompanying text. 
165. As explained extensively in this article, overbroad attack authority may, in rare 
situations, be a necessary and unfortunate effect of this clarity. However, that is the price 
armed forces have paid historically for the benefit of targeting clarity. Accordingly, even a 
narrow conception of a least harmful means rule characterized as “the law of the Proto-









mation on how an individual can overcome that presumption of targetabil-
ity and obtain the humanitarian protection derived from the alternate status 
of hors de combat. Article 41 indicates that “[a] person who is recognized or 
who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall 
not be made the object of attack.”166 Using the language “who is recog-
nized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized” demonstrates 
that attackers must be aware of and be alert for indications from enemy 
fighters that they are no longer in combat in order to overcome that pre-
sumption. How such determinations are made and the information on 
which these determinations rest are also relevant to understanding the pro-
tection of hors de combat and whether it contributes to a least harmful means 
rule. 
The discussions during the negotiations reinforced that the decision re-
garding whether someone is in the power of an enemy is based on the en-
emy’s perception of that person’s situation.  The Parties generally agreed 
that “the prohibition extended only to attacks directed against persons who 
were, in fact, recognized to be hors de combat and those who, under the cir-
cumstances, should have been recognized by a reasonable man as hors de 
combat.”167 In that vein, the Brazilian representative stated, “[o]nly combat-
ants facing such an enemy could decide whether or not he had any possibil-
ity of defending himself.”168 Soldiers should certainly be looking for signals 
from those who seek to manifest their disassociation with enemy belliger-
ent leadership by rendering themselves hors de combat, either affirmative sig-
nals from those who are capable or recognition of an individual’s inability 
to affirmatively signal, but each soldier must ultimately use his or her dis-
cretion to determine if that signal is being effectively communicated. 
Significantly, resting discretion in the attacker to judge when an enemy 
belligerent is hors de combat goes hand in hand with the LOAC’s imposition 
of the burden on the enemy individual to clearly signal that he is hors de 
combat. Thus, the language concerning surrender places the burden on the 
surrendering soldier to indicate his intention to surrender “in an absolutely 
clear manner”169 before the attacker has the legal obligation to accept the 
surrender. More broadly in the hors de combat equation, the determination of 
                                                                                                                      
166. AP I, supra note 2, art. 41(1). 
167. XV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/236/Rev.1, at 384, ¶ 23. This par-
agraph from the official record of the conference is also quoted in PROTOCOL COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 9, at 483. See also BOTHE, supra note 137, at 220. 
168. XIV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/III/SR.29, at 277 ¶ 34. 
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whether an individual is in the power of an adversary rests with the attack-
er, after clear signaling from the person being attacked.170 That is, the at-
tacking party determines when it has an opposing fighter within its power, 
but can only do so, and is only obligated to do so, if there are clear and ob-
jectively unambiguous indications that the determination are warranted. 
Such indications are framed objectively by the nature of the confrontation, 
one that presumes all enemy belligerent personnel are hostile. The Commen-
tary explains, “a soldier who wishes to indicate that he is no longer capable 
of engaging in combat, or that he intends to cease combat, lays down his 
arms and raises his hands.”171 He must do something to signal to the at-
tacker that there is a reason to overcome the presumption that he is hostile 
and to instead consider him as no longer taking hostile actions and as hors 
de combat. 
As A.P.V. Rogers encapsulates the approach of the negotiating States 
in Law on the Battlefield,  
 
Protocol I goes on to state that a person who is recognized or 
who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de 
combat shall not be made the object of attack. A person is hors de 
combat if he is in the power of an adverse party, he clearly ex-
presses an intention to surrender, or has been rendered uncon-
scious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and 
therefore is incapable of defending himself. However, he must 
abstain from any hostile act and must not attempt to escape. 
 
No procedure is laid down, but normally a soldier surrendering 
would be expected to put down his weapons and come out into 
the open with his hands raised above his head  . . . [using a sur-
render example from Iraq war]. In the case of the wounded, it is 
only those who either stop fighting, or are prevented by their 
wounds from fighting, who are protected . . . [using an example 
of a soldier who carried on fighting despite wounds until he was 
killed].172 
 
                                                                                                                      
170. XV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/236/Rev.1, at 384 ¶ 23. See also 
DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 161. 
171. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 486. The Commentary offers alterna-
tive options, including “to cease fire, wave a white flag and emerge from a shelter with 
hands raised. . . . Even if he is surprised, a combatant can raise his arms to indicate that he 
is surrendering, even though he may still be carrying weapons.” Id. at 487. 








In summary, combatants and fighters are presumptively targetable, but 
can signal to attacking forces that they are hors de combat, and thereby over-
come that presumption, by surrendering or otherwise indicating clearly that 
they are unable or unwilling to continue engaging in combat. The decision 
of whether someone is in the power of an attacker is based on an objec-
tively reasonable determination by the attacker.173 These two components 
of the hors de combat equation—the burden on the individual for a clear in-
dication of being “out of the fight” and the soldier’s discretion in interpret-
ing such indications—are highly relevant to the potential existence of a 
least harmful means rule. First, the very fact that only after those two dis-
tinct elements are satisfied does the authority to attack terminate provides 
strong reaffirmation of a broad and historically recognized right to attack 
(with the full import of the meaning of the term “attack” as explained 
above) enemy belligerents in the absence of an hors de combat determination. 
Second, this hors de combat framework is not a continuum of use of force, 
but rather an either/or determination—again severely undermining the ar-
gument that the LOAC includes a least harmful means rule or obligation. 
 
iii. “Abstains from any hostile act” 
 
Hors de combat provides permanent protection from attack as long as the 
individual abstains from hostile acts. Article 41(2)(c) therefore adds a pro-
viso to the list of situations rendering an individual hors de combat, noting 
that such person will be hors de combat “provided that in any of these cases 
he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.”174 Indeed, 
the negotiating record from the Diplomatic Conference reinforces that hors 
de combat and hostile acts are simply incompatible, that “the determining 
factor [in identifying a person as hors de combat] was abstention from hostile 
acts of any kind.”175 An individual who might at one point be considered 
hors de combat could then revert to participating in hostilities and become 
subject again to the presumption of hostility either by taking hostile actions 
or by attempting to escape. 
                                                                                                                      
173. XV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDHI236/Rev.l, at 383 ¶ 21. This deci-
sion is not always easy to make in the heat of the battle. The Commentary recognizes this by 
stating “It would be useless to deny that in the heat of action and under the pressure of 
events, this rule is not always easy to follow.” PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 
480. 
174. AP I, supra note 2, art. 41(2)(c). 
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The Commentary echoes the significance of resumption of hostile con-
duct as revoking hors de combat protection.  
 
A man who is in the power of his adversary may be tempted to 
resume combat if the occasion arises. Another may be tempted 
to feign a surrender in order to gain an advantage, which consti-
tutes an act of perfidy. Yet another, who has lost consciousness, 
may come to and show an intent to resume combat. It is self-
evident that in these different situations, and in any other similar 
situations, the safeguard ceases. Any hostile act gives the adver-
sary the right to take countermeasures until the perpetrator of the 
hostile act is recognized, or in the circumstances, should be rec-
ognized, to be hors de combat once again.176  
 
Thus, once an individual has been determined to be hors de combat, he re-
mains so characterized throughout the fight, and potentially even after the 
conflict ends,177 although hostile actions or attempts to escape will forfeit 
such protection.  
 
b.  Limits on the Means and Methods of Warfare 
 
The hors de combat rules protect belligerents based on their condition or ac-
tions when confronted with potential deadly attack by an opponent. Addi-
tional Protocol I includes and reaffirms an equally important set of protec-
tions based on how belligerents are attacked, through limitations on the 
means and methods of warfare. States have long negotiated agreements 
prohibiting the use of certain methods or means of warfare, and, as noted 
earlier, one of the LOAC’s foundational documents, the St. Petersburg 
Declaration, stemmed from precisely such motivation.178 The section of 
                                                                                                                      
176. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 488. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 3, 
at 169 (a hostile act includes “still participating in the battle, or directly supporting battle 
action.”). 
177. XV Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/236/Rev.l, at 385 ¶ 26. 
178. For example, see St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 54; Protocol for the Pro-
hibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId
=58A096110540867AC12563CD005187B9; Convention for Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in Event of Armed Conflict & Regulations, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, available 
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/400; Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-








Additional Protocol I addressing Methods and Means of Warfare (Section I 
of Part III) has the primary purpose of reaffirming the fundamental princi-
ples of the rules governing conduct between belligerents established more 
than a century ago. As the Commentary explains, “[i]n addition to the general 
principle by which the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited, they contain two types of fundamental rules: on 
the one hand, humanitarian rules, and on the other hand, rules on good 
faith.”179 Reaffirming and bolstering these principles rests on the principle 
of limited warfare, central to the LOAC since the first codifications of the 
modern LOAC in the Lieber Code and the St. Petersburg Declaration. 
Additional Protocol I’s limitations on the means and methods of war-
fare are: 1) the prohibition on the use of weapons and methods of warfare 
of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering; 2) the prohibition on using 
means or methods of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread 
and severe damage to the environment; 3) the prohibition of perfidy; and 
4) prohibitions on using recognized emblems or the flags, uniforms or em-
blems of the enemy party.180 Only the first of these is relevant to whether a 
potential least harmful means obligations exists in the LOAC. The negoti-
ating parties engaged in extensive debate about how and where to set the 
parameters of the prohibition against inflicting unnecessary suffering, and 
ultimately refrained from “rendering it more complete and precise.”181 The 
decision to leave the prohibition, set forth in Article 35(2), as a general 
statement without either specifying certain weapons or making only ab-
stract humanitarian statements also reflected the fact that, as one party not-
                                                                                                                      
and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/450?OpenDocument; Convention on the Prohibition 
of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 
31 U.S.T. 333 (1977), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/ 460?OpenDocument. 
179. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 381–82. See also Downey, supra note 
52, at 261 (“Regulated violence is generally considered as that violence directed or author-
ized by superior authority for the purpose of disabling the greatest possible number of the 
enemy, but the military effect of which is not disproportionate to the suffering it entails. 
This definition is a compromise between the conflicting military and humanitarian con-
cepts of the purpose of war. Under this definition of regulated violence the paramount 
military interest is to kill or disable the greatest possible number of the enemy and the 
subservient humanitarian interest is to relieve the individual soldier from all unnecessary 
suffering.”). 
180. See AP I, supra note 2, arts. 35, 37, 38, 39. 
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ed, “[i]n humanitarian law, of course, it was essential to bear in mind pre-
sent-day realities.”182  
Section II of this Article analyzed the meaning and breadth of the prin-
ciple of unnecessary suffering and the limits it sets on the use of attack au-
thority against belligerents. It is important to emphasize here, however, that 
the limitations on means and methods of warfare do not, as some argue,183 
support the conclusion that employing combat power as a first resort that 
is highly likely to kill an opponent is also prohibited. There is an important 
distinction between these two assertions. Use of methods or means of war-
fare that create a high probability of death as a first resort does not indicate 
that death is the intended outcome of the engagement. Instead, the intend-
ed outcome is to attack the enemy with the type of overwhelming combat 
power that results in the enemy’s “prompt submission” in the most effi-
cient manner possible, an objective unquestionably justified by military ne-
cessity.184 While these methods and means will often kill the lawful objects 
of attack, their employment cannot be understood as rendering death inevi-
table in the sense of the LOAC prohibition.185 Instead, it is a method of 
warfare intended to maximize the probability of disabling an opponent.  
                                                                                                                      
182. VI Official Records, supra note 109, CDDH/SR.39, at 100 ¶ 52. 
183. See Goodman, supra note 7; INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 82; Nils 
Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques 
of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 831, 904–09 (2010); 
JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 75–76 
(1975); Luban, supra note 8, at 40. 
184. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLE, supra note 137, at 194–95 (defining military necessi-
ty as the principle justifying measures “relevant and proportionate” to securing the prompt 
submission of the enemy). 
185. The use of the term “attack” throughout this article reflects an important aspect 
of lawful targeting authority. An order to attack may routinely result in infliction of death 
as a first resort. However, an order to attack should not be equated with an order to kill. 
This is not a distinction without significance. Causing death as a measure of first resort as 
the result of an attack is unquestionably permissible when force is directed against enemy 
belligerents. However, because such attacks are not conducted to kill, but to bring the 
enemy into submission as efficiently as possible, they do not render death “inevitable”, as 
prohibited by the LOAC. Even in the most tactically practical vernacular of combat forc-
es, it is far more likely that a junior leader will direct soldiers to “shoot him!” or “engage 
that target!” rather than to “kill him” or “kill that enemy.” While it is obviously impossible 
to claim that use of the word “kill” in such orders never occurs, we believe combat leaders 
instinctively characterize the employment of deadly combat power as “engagements” or 
“attacks.” No matter what terminology may be used, as a legal matter it is an order to at-








Achieving this effect is central to military operations, and the consistent 
practice of state armed forces engaged in combat operations, their training, 
and the type of weapons they are provided reflects this purpose as well. 
Hays Parks, one of the most respected experts on the application of the 
LOAC to the use of military weaponry (who not only personally experi-
enced close combat as a Marine officer in Vietnam, but also served as the 
principal U.S. government LOAC expert for nearly four decades and was 
integrally involved in virtually every significant LOAC treaty development 
during that period) also emphasized this point. Criticizing the ICRC’s reli-
ance on the principle of unnecessary suffering as a basis for a least harmful 
means obligation in the LOAC, Parks explains,  
 
For example, the document suggests that the prohibition of un-
necessary suffering or superfluous injury meant “if a combatant 
can be put out of action by taking him prisoner, he should not be 
injured; if he can be put out of action by injury, he should not be 
killed; and if he can be put out of action by light injury, grave in-
jury should be avoided.” This argument is not consistent with 
state practice or the practical nature of the battlefield, much less 
the domestic law of most nations with regard to law enforcement 
use of deadly force against its own citizens. Subsequent negotia-
                                                                                                                      
acterize such attacks as “kill” missions. The enemy often will be killed, but that is an inevi-
table consequence of belligerent targeting authority. The authors therefore caution against 
use of terminology such as “kill lists” to characterize approved enemy targets. Targets are 
attacked with methods and means assessed as ideal to produce the necessary tactical and 
operational effect and, therefore, “attack” or “targeting” lists are a more accurate charac-
terization. Indeed, U.S. joint doctrine reflects this by defining targeting and targets as fol-
lows: 
 
The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires into joint 
operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and 
matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational require-
ments and capabilities. Targeting also supports the process of linking the de-
sired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the joint force component level. 
A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or ac-
tion. It may be an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, func-
tion, individual, group, system, entity, or behavior identified for possible action 
to support the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. Targets relate to 
objectives at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. 
 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting vii (2007). This same doctrinal 
publication defines different categories of targets and target lists, such as the Joint Inte-
grated Prioritized Targeting List. Id. at II–8. With regard to the LOAC prohibition on 
“rendering death inevitable,” see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra 
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tions in the CCW [Convention on Certain Conventional Weap-
ons] process did not support this argument as a definition of 
what constitutes unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.186 
 
In essence, therefore, limitations on specific means and methods do 
not equate to a general principle requiring that the least restrictive means 
must be used in every (or any) combat engagement. So long as the intended 
object of attack is an enemy belligerent not yet rendered hors de combat and 
the methods and means (weapons and tactics) used to attack that target are 
lawful (in U.S. practice, this is established for weapons fielded in accord-
ance with a legal review at the time of procurement, and for tactics subject 
to legal review during operational planning187), the suffering resulting from 
the attack is conclusively necessary and therefore lawfully inflicted—even if 
some less harmful means may have been effective in disabling the enemy. 
 
c. Denial of Quarter 
 
The prohibition on the denial of quarter, which appears in Article 40, has 
formed part of the law of war for centuries and across many cultures. The 
article reads: “It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to 
threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.”188 
Originally suggested as part of the article discussed above on safeguarding 
individuals who are hors de combat,189 upon agreement of the negotiating 
states, it was ultimately included as a separate provision.190  
The purposes underlying the prohibition on denial of quarter and its 
inclusion as separate article, apart from the obligation to safeguard those 
who are hors de combat, bear on the question of whether the LOAC includes 
a least harmful means rule. First, the prohibition derives not only from 
humanitarian concerns, but also directly from the principle of military ne-
cessity and its symmetry with military operational logic. As one of the au-
                                                                                                                      
186. Parks, supra note 72, at 72–73 n.65. 
187. AP I, supra note 2, art. 36. The United States has implemented the requirement 
to review proposed weapons in Deputy Secretary of Defense, DOD Directive 5000.01, 
The Defense Acquisition System ¶ E1.1.15 (2003) (Certified Current as of Nov. 20, 2007), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf. See CORN ET 
AL., supra note 43, at 228–31 for an example of a weapons review. 
188. AP I, supra note 2, art. 40. 
189. I Official Records, supra note 109, pt. III, at 312. 
190. Id., XIV Official Records, CDDH/III/SR.38, at 277 ¶ 34; Id., XV Official Rec-








thoritative commentaries on Additional Protocol I explains, a “declaration 
or order that there shall be no survivors, or that no prisoners shall be tak-
en, tends to stiffen the adversary’s will to resist and is therefore counter-
productive to the achievement of the legitimate objectives of a military op-
eration.”191 Second, the negotiating history and analysis of this provision 
also highlights that the denial of quarter provision is concerned solely with 
the treatment of captured adversaries, not with either the determination of 
who is hors de combat or with the use of combat power against enemy bellig-
erents before they are captured.192 Thus, it provides no support for the im-
position of an obligation to offer an enemy suspected of a practical inability 
to effectively resist the opportunity to surrender (although as a matter of 
policy this will often be done), and therefore is almost irrelevant to the least 
harmful means debate. 
 
d. Escaping Prisoners 
 
Some commentators argue that one other provision of Additional Protocol 
I is relevant to a least harmful means rule: the rules governing the use of 
force against escaping prisoners. As noted above, prisoners lose their pro-
tections as persons who are hors de combat when they attempt to make an 
escape. This rule is not new to Additional Protocol I, but originally ap-
peared in the Brussels Declaration of 1874.193 Under Article 41(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I, attempted escape is considered a hostile act and 
when a prisoner of war attempts to escape, the presumption of hostility 
returns until that individual meets the criteria of hors de combat once again. 
The Commentary echoes the negotiating parties’ determination in this regard 
by adding this elaboration: 
 
If they make an attempt to escape or commit any hostile act, the 
use of arms against them is once more permitted within the con-
ditions prescribed in the Third Convention. The same applies a 
fortiori for adversaries who benefit only from the safeguard of Ar-
ticle 41 without being recognized as prisoners of war. In fact, the 
proviso at the end of the present paragraph specifically provides 
it.194 
                                                                                                                      
191. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 137, at 217. 
192. See, e.g., PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 476–77. 
193. Brussels Declaration, supra note 95, art. 28(2) (“Arms may be used, after sum-
moning, against a prisoner of war attempting to escape.”). 








The reference to the Third Geneva Convention is useful here for un-
derstanding the reach of this rule and the difference between the use of 
force against escaping prisoners and against belligerents in the course of 
combat operations. Both the Commentary to the Additional Protocols and 
the Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention explain that only such 
force as required by the circumstances—stopping the escape—is al-
lowed.195 This is, admittedly, a different measure of force than that which 
the LOAC permits against belligerents in the course of military operations, 
but the circumstances and the accordant presumptions associated with the 
escapee are fundamentally different.  
That difference is crucial to understanding why the more restricted use 
of force (“if circumstances require it”) authorized against escaping prison-
ers is not the rule with regard to belligerents in general. Before the escape, 
the prisoner is protected from attack as one who is hors de combat. For this 
reason, acts preparatory to escape do not justify the use of deadly force 
precisely because at that time, the individual is still hors de combat and pro-
tected.196 Only once the prisoner has begun and is in the process of escape 
does he lose the protection of hors de combat (as explained above) and be-
come susceptible to the use of deadly force, for it is as this point that the 
risk of his re-association with enemy belligerent leadership and his potential 
to engage in hostilities on behalf of that leadership become significant 
enough to justify the use of deadly force to prevent that return to belliger-
ent status. The situation of a belligerent is simply inapposite to that of a 
prisoner preparing to or thinking about escape: the belligerent, until hors de 
                                                                                                                      
195. See id. at 488 (“An escape, or an attempt at escape, by a prisoner or any other 
person considered to be hors de combat, justifies the use of arms for the purpose of stopping 
him. However, once more, the use of force is only lawful to the extent that the circum-
stances require it. It is only permissible to kill a person who is escaping if there is no other 
way of preventing the escape in the immediate circumstances.”); GC III COMMENTARY, 
supra note 19, at 246–47 (“Captivity is based on force, and although there can be no doubt 
on the matter, it is recognized in international customary law that the Detaining Power has 
the right to resort to force in order to keep prisoners captive. At the same time, this con-
sideration also limits the use of weapons against prisoners. Whether in the case of at-
tempted escape or any other demonstration . . ., the use of weapons ‘shall constitute an 
extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warning appropriate to the circum-
stances.’”). 
196. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 246 (“It is also important, however, 
to make a distinction between escape proper and acts or phases preparatory thereto. If a 
prisoner is surprised within the camp limits while making preparations to escape, there is 








combat, remains subject to attack pursuant to the presumption of hostility 
derived from that status. That individual therefore does not benefit from 
any protections that would mandate a lesser use of force than that which 
the LOAC permits in accordance with the fundamental principles of mili-
tary necessity and humanity. 
 
D. What AP I Does Not Require 
 
Proponents of a least harmful means rule—an obligation to capture rather 
than kill when attacking enemy belligerents—rely ultimately on the oft-
repeated and foundational provision of the LOAC: “the right of belliger-
ents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”197 This notion, 
appearing with varying wording first in the St. Petersburg Declaration, then 
the 1907 Hague Regulations, and ultimately in Article 35 of Additional Pro-
tocol I, is indeed fundamental to understanding the LOAC and the com-
plementary and interlocking relationship between military necessity and 
humanity. No more, however, it is an equally powerful reminder that bel-
ligerents have extensive means—and authority—for injuring the enemy. 
The fact that Article 35 of Additional Protocol I’s statement of this princi-
ple is then followed by several important affirmative limits on the means of 
attacking the enemy—discussed extensively in the previous section—is de-
cisive evidence that those stated limitations and prohibitions are the only 
limits, and that any other required restraints on attacking enemy belliger-
ents would have appeared in the same location in the positive LOAC. 
 
1. The Travaux Préparatoires and the Treaty Itself 
 
The previous section details Additional Protocol I’s affirmative prohibi-
tions and constraints on the use of combat power to attack belligerents. 
These prohibitions stem from the treaty law and customary principles da-
ting back to the foundational documents of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Nowhere in Additional Protocol I can one find a rule obligating belliger-
ents to use the least harmful means available in targeting enemy belliger-
ents. Such a rule, if it did exist or was even intended to be added by the 
State parties, would naturally fit in Part III, “Methods and means of war-
fare—Combatant and prisoner-of-war status.” This section, devoted to the 
reaffirmation of both humanitarian rules, such as minimizing unnecessary 
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suffering, and good faith rules, such as the prohibition on perfidy, “has a 
key function in relation to the other provisions of the Protocol, since non-
respect for the rules of combat entails non-respect for all other rules.”198 
Consider also the hierarchical importance of a least harmful means rule, if 
it were to exist. Such a rule would apply to all belligerents, not just those 
wounded, captured, or attempting escape. It would therefore not only be 
present in this section of Additional Protocol I, but would have primacy of 
place. Indeed, the absence of such a rule is telling, in and of itself. 
Nor does the travaux préparatoires or the Commentary provide any indica-
tion that such a rule was actually the intent of the drafters and simply not 
expressed in a coherent positive manner. Rather, the Protocol is under-
stood as the pinnacle of humanitarian protections during armed conflict, 
for both civilians and combatants. The Commentary emphasizes the humani-
tarian success story of Additional Protocol I, declaring that “[i]f it had not 
been possible to impose limitations on certain methods of combat, there 
would have been reason to fear that the credibility of humanitarian law 
would suffer seriously as a consequence.”199 At the same time, the drafters 
also understood the need to keep the rules and principles applicable to the 
realities of combat and workable for those tasked with their implementa-
tion, and believed that they had accomplished both tasks in a manner both 
protective and effective. As Jean Pictet wrote in the introduction to the 
Commentary, “it is all the more necessary to explain [the Protocols] and en-
sure that they are understood at all levels, and most of all, by those who 
will be responsible for putting them into practice.”200 Were a new rule re-
quiring least harmful means—one not present in the treaty or customary 
antecedents to the Protocols—incorporated into Additional Protocol I, this 
need for clarity and understanding would have demanded a clear statement 
of the rule so as to make it both evident and understandable for the com-
manders and soldiers obligated to execute it in the course of military opera-
tions.201 Again, the absence of such interpretive guidance and explication is 
deafening. 
 
                                                                                                                      
198. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 382. 
199. Id. at 589. 
200. Id. at xxxv. 
201. For example, provisions of human rights law requiring the use of the least harm-
ful means state such obligation clearly. See ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 6; Convention for the 









2.  Proportionality versus Proportionality and the Consequences of 
Conflation 
 
One explanation for the assertion of a least harmful means rule is that it is 
an explicit (or perhaps subtle) effort to extend human rights law’s propor-
tionality protections applicable to peacetime law enforcement activities into 
the treatment of belligerents during armed conflict. A look at the unfortu-
nately all too common conflation and confusion of the various legal princi-
ples of proportionality explains how, first, the principle of proportionality 
found in Additional Protocol I does not apply to belligerents and, second, 
Additional Protocol I, and the LOAC in general, does not include a sepa-
rate proportionality obligation with regard to belligerents. Proportionality is 
a term discussed in a variety of ways and settings with regard to the use of 
force by states and individuals and against states, individuals and objects. It 
is a central principle of the LOAC, a key normative requirement framing 
the right to use force in self-defense, and an essential factor limiting the use 
of force within law enforcement and human rights parameters. 
These forms of proportionality differ substantially from each other. 
“[P]roportionality in law enforcement is a strikingly different concept from 
its meaning and function under the law of armed conflict.”202 The former 
focuses on the object of state violence—the target of the deadly force—
while the latter focuses on the unintended victims of the use of force, 
which is directed at legitimate targets of attack. When the two are conflat-
ed, the result is that one or more of these different forms of proportionali-
ty may be applied when it is not relevant or, perhaps more troubling, may 
not be applied when it should.203 Still more problematic, when they become 
conflated or the lines between them become blurred, the force of these key 
principles of international law will be diminished. 
As a preliminary matter therefore, consider the scenario in which sol-
diers fighting in an armed conflict would no longer be able to use lethal 
force as a first resort absent a showing of individualized threat and necessi-
ty in every case, which is the exact effect of a least harmful means rule. 
Here, the LOAC’s acceptance of targeting on the basis of status (for certain 
categories of persons) would be substantially diluted, if not nullified. On 
                                                                                                                      
202. Dale Stephens, Military Involvement in Law Enforcement, 92 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 453, 462 (2010). 
203. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Self-Defense 
and Armed Conflict Justifications, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW 1655 (2012); Corn, 
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first glance, many might argue that such a development seems more pro-
tective of rights. However, it would unravel the inherent delicate balance 
between military necessity and humanity that lies at the heart of the LOAC, 
likely trending too far in the direction of the latter. “There is no treaty lan-
guage regarding ‘proportionate force’ applied against military units or other 
military objectives, and State practice historically has emphasized applica-
tion of ‘overwhelming force’ against enemy forces.”204 More important, 
“[c]onflating these disparate principles into a singular regulatory norm sub-
stantially degrades the scope of lawful targeting authority and confuses 
those charged with executing combat operations.”205 In addition, when sol-
diers can no longer use force in a manner appropriate to fulfill their mis-
sion to defend against and defeat the relevant threat, the state fails to pro-
tect its own citizens from ongoing or future attacks, in and of itself a severe 
decrease in the protection of civilians from the dangers of war. 
The relationship between attack authority and the core LOAC principle 
of proportionality further bolsters the conclusion that the law does not in-
clude a least harmful means limitation.206 The LOAC principle of propor-
tionality requires that parties refrain from attacks in which the expected 
civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the anticipated military ad-
vantage gained. It therefore does impose additional limitations on attack 
                                                                                                                      
204. W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No Man-
date, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW & POLICY 769, 806–07 n.103 (010); see id., at 815 (noting that the use of a law 
enforcement paradigm subjects wartime military operations to an unrealistic “use-of-force 
continuum . . . beginning with the least-injurious action before resorting to ‘grave injury’ in 
attack of an enemy combatant or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities”). In addition, 
the application of human rights law as a governing paradigm for armed conflict “is still 
widely perceived as battlefield-inadequate, risky to implement, and therefore unrealistic.” 
Robin Geiß & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the 
Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 11, 25 (2011); see 
also Corn & Jenks, supra note 38, at 347 (“[I]t is common practice to use overwhelming 
force against . . . enemy objectives in order to influence the subsequent behavior of enemy 
leadership and other enemy forces.”). 
205. Geoffrey S. Corn, Self Defense Targeting: Conflict Classification or Willful Blindness?, in 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16, 20 (Ken-
neth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012)(Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International 
Law Studies). 
206. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 52(2) (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military ob-
jectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstanc-








authority even when directed at a lawful military objective (target). Howev-
er, this limitation in no way operates to protect lawful objects of attack, e.g. 
enemy belligerents. Rather, attacks will violate this principle when the an-
ticipated harm to civilians is excessive compared to the military advantage 
anticipated by the otherwise lawful attack against enemy belligerents.207 
Thus, unlike the peacetime/human rights proportionality counterpart, the 
intended object of attack—the enemy belligerent—is never the beneficiary 
of the LOAC variant of this principle.208 
In contrast, proportionality in human rights law refers to the measure 
of force directed at the intended target of the attack. Law enforcement au-
thorities can use no more force than is absolutely necessary to effectuate an 
arrest, defend themselves, or defend others from attack. “In the domestic 
context, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the aim to be 
achieved.”209 In Resolution 34/169, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, which states 
that “[l]aw enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary 
and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.”210 The com-
mentary to this provision states that the principle of proportionality re-
stricts the use of force by such officials. In particular, in human rights law 
and law enforcement, “the principle of proportionality operates to protect 
the object of state violence by allowing only that amount of force necessary 
to subdue a hostile actor.”211 
This disparate focus of the proportionality protections is logical in rela-
tion to the disparate purposes of the employment of violence within these 
distinct contexts. When state actors employ violence during peacetime, it is 
considered an exceptional situation.212 The goal of such violence is to re-
                                                                                                                      
207. See id., art. 51; see also ROGERS, supra note 3, at 17–23; DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 
128–38.  
208. See Targeted Killings Case, supra note 6, ¶ 46, (“[P]roportionality is not required re-
garding harm to a combatant, or to a civilian taking a direct part in the hostilities at such 
time as the harm is caused. Indeed, a civilian taking part in hostilities is endangering his 
life, and he might—like a combatant—be the objective of a fatal attack. That killing is 
permitted.”). 
209. Watkin, supra note 50, at 32–33 (citing McCann , supra note 30, ¶ 149). 
210. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials art. 3, G.A. Res. 34/169, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979). 
211. GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 36, at 80. 
212. See Code of Conduct, supra note 210. In September of 1990, the Eighth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders adopted 
the “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.” 
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store the status quo ante—a safe environment for society—and the indi-
vidual disrupting that safety retains the same legal protections enjoyed by 
all citizens of the state. As a result, only the amount of force necessary to 
restore a safe and secure environment is tolerated, because employing addi-
tional force cannot be justified by the purpose of state action.  
During armed conflict, in contrast, the objective of using force against 
any enemy belligerent is to contribute to the submission of an enemy as 
promptly and efficiently as possible. History testifies to the fact that this 
objective is often implemented by unrelenting and violent application of 
force in a manner that demonstrates to an enemy the futility of continued 
resistance. Even fundamental principles of military operations reflect this 
truism. For example, pursuant to the principle of mass, a military com-
mander is instructed to bring maximum firepower and resources to bear on 
critical points of the battlefield and enemy vulnerabilities in order to over-
whelm the enemy.213 The notion of striking an enemy with “overwhelming” 
force is a basic and core principle of military operations,214 but it is also a 
                                                                                                                      
as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and fire-
arms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without 
any promise of achieving the intended result.” See UN Principles, supra note 30. This hu-
man rights based Code of Conduct also provides that: 
 
5. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law en-
forcement officials shall: 
(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness 
of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; 
(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life; 
(c) Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or 
affected persons at the earliest possible moment; 
(d) Ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person 
are notified at the earliest possible moment. 
 
Id.  
213. See FM 3-0, supra note 70, at 4-39 (2011). Although this foundational doctrinal 
publication is now superseded by ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, the principles of 
war remain central to the synchronization and effective application of combat power. The 
principle of mass is synonymous with the concentration of combat power in order to pro-
duce decisive effect. See supra note 70. This definition reveals that it is a fundamental prin-
ciple of combat operations to bring overwhelming combat power to bear against an op-
ponent at the decisive place and time. Any interpretation of the law that would require an 
operational commander to “capture instead of wound” and “wound instead of kill” would 
be inconsistent with this principle.  
214. Id. This principle was also central to what came to be known as the “Wein-
berger” and “Powell” doctrines—both of which proposed criteria for assessing the pro-
priety of committing United States armed forces to combat operations. Both Weinberger 








reflection that the fundamental objectives of armed conflict are incon-
sistent with making enemy forces the beneficiaries of a proportionality rule. 
The contrasting implementation of the proportionality obligation in the 
context of peace operations or belligerent occupations also illustrates the 
disparate meaning and application of this principle. During such opera-
tions, presumptive threats in the form of hostile forces are rarely recog-
nized. Instead, like police officers, armed forces conducting such missions 
operate under use-of-force authority triggered by the conduct of the indi-
viduals they encounter, rather than by status.215 When that conduct pre-
sents a threat, the use of force is authorized in response. However, because 
the purpose of such use is to restore the status quo ante of a safe and se-
cure environment—as for a police officer—and because individuals creat-
ing a threat are normally not considered to be agents of a collective bellig-
erent enemy—unlike defined enemy belligerents—extensive effort is ex-
pended to train soldiers to react to such threats with only that amount of 
force necessary to subdue the object of the use of force. In short, the ob-
ject of state action in peace operations, like the object of force used by a 
police officer, is the beneficiary of the proportionality protection. 
An oft-cited example of the conflation of the LOAC and human rights 
principles appears in the 2006 Targeted Killings case before the Israeli Su-
preme Court. In analyzing the lawfulness of the Israeli government’s policy 
of “targeted frustration,” the Court held, inter alia, that 
 
[a] civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at 
such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be em-
ployed. . . . Indeed, among the military means, one must choose 
the means whose harm to the human rights of the harmed per-
                                                                                                                      
es capable of overwhelming opposition central to their proposed criterion. See Colin L. 
Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1992/1993, at 32. A classic 
example of striking an enemy with overwhelming combat power was Operation Just 
Cause, the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989 to oust General Manuel Noriega and disa-
ble the Panamanian Defense Forces. See THOMAS DONNELLY ET AL., OPERATION JUST 
CAUSE: THE STORMING OF PANAMA (1991). 
215. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & UNITED 
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERA-
TIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2008). See also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and 
Gbao (RUF case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement (Special Court for Sierra Leone 
March 2, 2009) (holding that peacekeepers are entitled to the protections granted to civil-
ians and civilian objects under the LOAC because, inter alia, they are only authorized to 
use force in self-defense under their rules of engagement and operational orders); TREVOR 
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son is smallest. Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostili-
ties can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means 
which should be employed.216 
 
This case is often cited as a persuasive example of state practice sup-
porting a least harmful means obligation in the LOAC. However, the Israe-
li Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful 
means are available—even in the context of an armed conflict—“impose[s] 
a requirement not based in [the LOAC].”217 Indeed, the Israeli Supreme 
Court “used the kernel of a human rights rule—that necessity must be 
shown for any intentional deprivation of life, to restrict the application of 
[a LOAC] rule—that in armed conflict no necessity need be shown for the 
killing of combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.”218 Of 
equal importance is the fact that the ruling is limited to the unique set of 
facts applicable to a decades-long occupation of Palestinian territories. In 
those circumstances, infusion of human rights principles, which would in-
clude a least harmful means rule in relation to military use of force against 
hostile civilians, is not overly controversial. But that analysis is wholly in-
apposite to situations of armed conflict not involving the additional layer of 
norms applicable to belligerent occupation.219 Accordingly, the ruling does 
                                                                                                                      
216. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 6, at 40. The Court held that (1) the conflict be-
tween Israel and the relevant Palestinian armed groups is an international armed conflict; 
(2) terrorists are not combatants but are civilians taking a direct part in hostilities; and (3) 
such terrorists can be lawfully targeted during and for such time as they are taking a direct 
part in hostilities. 
217. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeted Killings and International Law: Law Enforcement, Self-
Defense, and Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 525, 552 (Roberta Arnold & 
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008). 
218. Milanovic, supra note 4, at 120. 
219. As the Court explained,  
 
Arrest, investigation, and trial are not means which can always be used. At times 
the possibility does not exist whatsoever; at times it involves a risk so great to 
the lives of the soldiers, that it is not required. However, it is a possibility which 
should always be considered. It might actually be particularly practical under the 
conditions of belligerent occupation, in which the army controls the area in 
which the operation takes place, and in which arrest, investigation, and trial are 
at times realizable possibilities. 
 
Targeted Killings Case, supra note 6 at 40; see also GURULÉ & CORN, supra note 36, at 86 (Sug-
gesting that the mixing of the LOAC and law enforcement paradigms “may be explained 
by the unique occupation relationship between the two parties to the conflict, a relation-








not support a broader capture rather than kill obligation.220 Even though a 
“proportional” use of force restriction protecting the object of attack was 
clearly an aspect of this ruling, it is limited both in context (belligerent oc-
cupation) and with regard to the object of protection (civilians directly par-
ticipating in hostilities, not belligerents221) in such a way that it does not 
support the broader application of the rule. 
It is therefore logical to infer from the exclusion of the pre-submission 
belligerent from the LOAC’s proportionality protection that there is no 
analogous limitation imposed on lawful attack authority. If the LOAC did 
expressly, or even implicitly, include a least harmful means limitation appli-
cable to belligerents, then why would belligerents have been excluded from 
a positive rule that prohibits attack when the harm is considered “exces-
sive” to the military advantage anticipated? The answer seems clear: unlike 
a use of force against an individual who represents an actual threat in 
peacetime where human rights proportionality operates to protect the in-
tended object of state violence,222 resort to deadly combat power is justified 
based exclusively on the presumption of threat triggered by belligerent sta-








                                                                                                                      
haps the Court was tempering the effect of its broad interpretation of direct participation 
in hostilities, attempting to ensure that individuals not actually causing immediate harm to 
the [army] be subdued by less than lethal means when feasible. Ultimately, that aspect of 
the opinion, like the international armed conflict aspect, is arguably limited to the unique 
situation in the West Bank and Gaza”). Note, however, that since the time this case was 
decided, Israel has disengaged from the Gaza Strip, altering the nature of the legal regime 
applicable to targeted strikes in that area. 
220. See generally Watkin, supra note 50. 
221. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
222. See UN Principles, supra note 30; McCann, supra note 30, ¶ 149 (“In this respect 
the use of the term ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article 2(2) indicates that a stricter and more 
compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when deter-
mining whether State action is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under paragraph 2 of 
Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly propor-
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IV.  SYNCHRONIZING LAW, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICE 
 
A. The Relationship Between Law and Policy 
 
There is no question that contemporary military operations increasingly 
manifest the operational necessity for constraints on the otherwise lawful 
scope of use of force authority, constraints that frequently take the form of 
a least harmful means limitation. These constraints are routinely manifested 
in ROE. No understanding of the LOAC and how it affects the planning 
and execution of military operations would be complete without an exami-
nation of the relationship between the law and ROE. Although the LOAC 
and ROE are inextricably intertwined, they are two distinct sources of op-
erational regulation. 
As defined in U.S. military doctrine, ROE are “directives issued by 
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limita-
tions under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue com-
bat engagement with other forces encountered.”223 In other words, ROE 
are intended to give military leaders at all levels of command greater con-
trol over the execution of combat operations by subordinate forces. The 
history of warfare is replete with examples of what have essentially been 
ROE. For example, during the Battle of Bunker Hill,  Captain William 
Prescott imposed a limitation on the use of combat power by his forces in 
the form of the directive, “Don’t shoot until you see the whites of their 
eyes.”224 Given his limited resources against a much larger and better-
equipped foe, he used this tactical control measure to maximize the effect 
of his firepower. This example of what was, in effect, an ROE is remem-
bered to this day for two primary reasons: it enabled the colonial militia to 
maximize enemy casualties and, in so doing, exposed these forces to in-
creased risk—risk that the law did not oblige them to accept. 
ROE have become a key aspect of modern military operations225 and a 
key component of mission planning for U.S. and many other armed forc-
es.226 Although ROE are not coterminous with the LOAC, they must be 
                                                                                                                      
223. DoD Dictionary, supra note 78. 
224. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 446 & n.1 (Emily M. Beck ed., 
14th ed. 1968), quoted in Martins, supra note 86, at 34. 
225. See Daily Press Briefing, U.S. State Department (Oct. 3, 2007), available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/oct/93190.htm.  
226. See International & Operational Law Department, Judge Advocate General’s Le-








completely consistent with it. In other words, while some aspects of the 
LOAC do not affect a mission’s ROE, all ROE must comply with this law. 
For example, consider an ROE provision that allows a soldier to attack all 
members of the enemy armed forces once declared hostile. Although this 
provision is completely appropriate, the authority it provides extends only 
to enemy personnel who qualify as lawful objects of attack pursuant to the 
LOAC, and therefore would never permit attack against an enemy ren-
dered hors de combat.227 Similarly, if an ROE allows for a pilot to destroy a 
bridge with a bomb, it does not relieve the pilot of his responsibility to 
terminate the attack if he believes it will violate the principle of proportion-
ality.228 ROE will also often contain provisions that remind soldiers that 
they can only engage those who engage in defined conduct endangering 
soldiers or others, so called conduct-based ROE. This limitation even 
sometimes applies to enemy belligerents when the commander decides to 
limit the normal status-based attack authority. In so doing, ROE ensure 
LOAC compliance and routinely prohibit uses of force consistent with the 
LOAC in order to advance some additional strategic, operational, or tacti-
cal goal. 
Appreciating this interrelationship is therefore vital to understanding 
why the violation of a constraint imposed by a mission-specific ROE, or 
even customarily imposed by ROE, does not ipso facto establish a LOAC 
violation. To assess that apparent discrepancy, it is necessary to determine 
whether the ROE constraint was coterminous with the LOAC, or more 
restrictive than the scope of permissible authority derived from the LOAC. 
In contemporary military operations, including armed conflict, it is com-
mon for ROE to be more restrictive than the LOAC in order to satisfy 
policy considerations related to the application of combat power.229 Ac-
cordingly, identifying a common ROE constraint is simply not probative to 
the analysis of the existence of a legal rule imposing a similar constraint. In 
the context of a least harmful means rule, this distinction and interaction 
between the LOAC and ROE is therefore essential to understanding the 
content of the LOAC’s obligations with regard to belligerent attack author-
ity and when that authority terminates as a matter of law. 
                                                                                                                      
Operations, Rules of Engagement Handbook 1-1–1-32 (2000). 
227. Susan L. Turley, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?, 73 TEXAS LAW RE-
VIEW 139, 165 (1994) (“In both cases, Marine snipers said they were firing at men with 
machine guns, actions allowed under the Americans’ ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE).”). 
228. AP I, supra note 2, arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
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Although ROE have and will likely continue to periodically impose a 
least harmful means restraint on operations directed against enemy bellig-
erents, military operational art provides many logical explanations for im-
posing, on a contextual basis, such a limitation. These range from the de-
sire to capture the enemy as a means of obtaining intelligence to the effort 
to demonstrate to other enemy personnel the wisdom of submission. It is 
critical to recognize, however, that such restraints derive from operational 
motivations, and not humanitarian concern for the enemy belligerent oper-
ative. This indicates the fallacy in invoking such practices as evidence of a 
least harmful means obligation that limits the scope of attack authority. In-
deed, the history of armed conflict and tactical realities indicate that there 
are many situations where commanders choose to employ the full force of 
their combat capability with clear knowledge that many of the enemy oper-
atives subject to attack might be inclined to surrender, or pose no immedi-
ate significant threat to friendly forces. Attacking enemy forces in such sit-
uations confirms that the LOAC does not mandate a least harmful means 
consideration when engaging in operations to disable enemy belligerent 
operatives. 
 
B. Operational Challenges 
 
If a least harmful means rule did exist within the LOAC, or if such a rule 
were to be imposed, it would present significant and potentially crippling 
impediments in the implementation of that obligation. From training, to 
execution of operations, to investigation and accountability for violations 
of the law, no aspect of the intersection between law and military opera-
tions would be untouched or unhindered by the rule’s consequences. Fur-
thermore, although proponents of a least harmful means rule argue that it 
fulfills the LOAC’s core humanitarian purpose, such a rule has an equally 
opposite effect of undermining the LOAC’s role in protecting soldiers 
from the corrosive psychological and moral effects of combat. 
 
 1. Training 
 
The first and most obvious of these challenges is translating the rule into 
training and the ROE applicable to a declared hostile force. Proponents of 
the least harmful means rule cite the practice of including such a restriction 








cant.230 These proponents fail to appreciate, however, two significant fac-
tors that undermine this argument. First, even if it is operationally feasible 
to implement such a restriction in one tactical environment, this does not 
mean it is feasible in all tactical environments. Relying on the counterinsur-
gency context as a touchstone of feasibility therefore lacks credibility. What 
is necessary, rather, is to consider implementation of such a rule in every 
tactical context associated with the full range of operations that occur in 
armed conflict. Second, ROE are never effectively implemented simply by 
enunciating the relevant restriction on the use of force in an order, di-
rective, or ROE card. Rather, these restrictions are only as effective as the 
training that prepares soldiers to implement them. Accordingly, training for 
a combat environment is indelibly linked to the effectiveness of any ROE 
or other imposition of battlefield regulation. 
In considering this latter impediment, it is essential to note that if a 
least harmful means obligation were recognized, the obligation would not 
be context-specific, like ROE for a particular conflict or mission, but 
would require adherence in all conflict situations. As a result, this least 
harmful means rule would have to become an element of the baseline train-
ing for all members of the armed forces. From the inception of all combat 
training, an effective method would have to be developed to incorporate 
compliance with this obligation into the combat instincts that military train-
ing seeks to instill in the soldier.  
Certainly, the LOAC’s protection for individuals rendered hors de combat 
means that limitations on the legality of using force in combat are already 
an aspect of such training. The symmetry between the clarity provided by 
the rules of presumption associated with status-based targeting authority 
and such training is essential, however. The explicit indicia that trigger hors 
de combat status discussed above, coupled with the requirement that the 
non-disabled belligerent operative bears the burden to affirmatively mani-
fest surrender, facilitates a baseline standard of training and development 
that is effective for all soldiers, from the newly-minted private to the senior 
attack aircraft pilot. Injecting a least harmful means rule into this equation 
would compromise the efficacy of this warrior development process. By 
demanding the exercise of case-by-case judgment when engaged in hostili-
ties with a declared hostile opponent, it would significantly increase the 
burden on the attacking force to assess when the enemy belligerent oppo-
nent fell within the protections afforded to those considered hors de combat. 
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In contrast, leaving any least harmful means limitation within the policy 
realm provides the military commander the flexibility to tailor it to the mis-
sion, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilian considerations231 
applicable during a given operation.  
Training armed forces for armed conflict is thus in no way analogous 
to the training provided for peace officers or even for armed forces fo-
cused on a peacekeeping or stability support mission precisely because in 
armed conflict there is no expectation that responding to enemy threats 
will be graduated. Instead, unlike hostile actors encountered during peace 
operations, enemy combatants are presumed to always represent a threat of 
death or grievous bodily harm. Furthermore, the organizations they belong 
to also pose such a threat. It might be tempting to assume that shifting 
from one use of force paradigm to another is a simple task, but those fa-
miliar with the relationship between training and operational effectiveness 
know this is a highly complex process.232 As a result, effective training must 
be mission-driven, which means that preparation for armed conflict must 
focus primarily on developing a warrior ethos derived from the armed con-
flict use of force paradigm.233 Therefore, soldiers are trained to employ 
deadly force against such targets, irrespective of the conduct they encoun-
ter.  
The inclusion of a least harmful means rule in contemporary counterin-
surgency ROE indicates that this challenge is not insurmountable, of 
course. Indeed, soldiers can be trained to even more restrictive ROE 
standards, such as when they are engaged in peace-support or occupation 
operations. However, imposition of this type of policy-based constraint, as 
noted above, reflects a conscious command judgment that the increased 
risk imposed on friendly forces is offset by the tactical, operational, and 
strategic value of the constraint. This might make sense in the context of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, where the cost of perceived use of 
force over-breadth produced by status-based presumptions is not consid-
ered acceptable based on the risk associated with limiting that authority. In 
such contexts, the benefits of restraining otherwise lawful uses of force 
may justify this increased risk, but they do not dictate it. In other contexts, 
such as a high intensity conflict in Korea, the cost/benefit equation would 
likely be fundamentally different. Nor does the imposition of such con-
                                                                                                                      
231. Department of the Army, FM 5.0, The Operations Process (2012). 
232. See supra note 88. 








straints reflect recognition of a humanitarian obligation to impose such ad-
ditional risk on friendly forces.  
Furthermore, units operating pursuant to such ROE require significant 
training that prepares them to “ramp down” from the LOAC-based norm 
of pure status-based targeting.234 As a practical matter, restraining the in-
stinctual level of combat aggressiveness developed in baseline training pur-
suant to a pure status-based targeting standard makes it feasible to “ramp 
up” to the baseline norm on order. If, in contrast, the baseline standard of 
training must prepare the soldier to constantly question the permissibility 
of employing deadly combat power against a declared hostile enemy bellig-
erent operative who is still physically capable of engaging in operations and 
has not surrendered, it will produce an inevitable dilution of the aggres-
siveness that is frequently an essential component of seizing and retaining 
the initiative during an attack against enemy personnel.  
  
 2. Operational Complexity and Lack of Clarity 
 
The mix of status-based targeting authority with a conduct-based limitation 
that a least harmful means rule mandates would also compromise opera-
tional clarity. Unlike in the traditional execution of combat operations, bel-
ligerents would be adversely influenced by a de facto (if not de jure) presump-
tion that every use of force could be assessed as potentially unjustified and 
excessive, and every “shoot/don’t shoot” decision would be subject to cri-
tique requiring belligerents to justify their decision to attack on an individu-
al basis. This is acceptable in an operational context that does not involve 
confrontation with organized opposition belligerent groups, precisely be-
cause individuals encountered in such operational contexts are not pre-
                                                                                                                      
234. One of the authors, while advising a U.S. Army ground combat unit in Mosul, 
Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, observed the difficulties in quickly “ramping 
down” the ROE. In Mosul, suicide bombings of U.S. and Iraqi checkpoints and convoys 
were unfortunately commonplace. The corresponding ROE reflected that reality and U.S. 
forces would employ lethal force against vehicles approaching checkpoints or convoys 
that failed to heed warning signs and measures. Operational needs dictated reassigning one 
U.S. Army unit, which had been operating under these permissive ROE, to the Kurdish 
region of northern Iraq. That region was considerably safer and force was employed dif-
ferently and sparingly. But soldiers are not light switches, and within hours of relocating, 
the former Mosul-based soldiers were conducting a vehicle convoy, and when an un-
known vehicle approached the convoy at a high rate of speed and ignored warnings, the 
soldiers instinctively employed force appropriate for their previous operating environment 
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sumptively hostile. As a result, requiring individualized justification for em-
ploying deadly force would not be expected to compromise mission effec-
tiveness or subject friendly forces to significant risk. When, however, the 
operational context involves confronting organized belligerent opponents 
whose operations transcend normal criminality and rise to the level of 
armed conflict, imposing an individualized threat justification not only en-
dangers individual members of the force by producing an inevitable hesi-
tancy to employ deadly force, but also compromises the legitimate function 
of the state action by degrading the effectiveness of forces in subduing the 
opponent.235 It is therefore unsurprising that the history of armed conflict 
and the law developed to regulate armed conflict compel the conclusion 
that it is the precise opposite presumption that must dictate belligerent rela-
tions in the battle space. 
It cannot be overemphasized that a legal obligation to implement a 
least harmful means rule would not apply only to certain types of tactical 
contexts (such as COIN operations) or certain methods of warfare (such as 
attack with remotely piloted vehicles). Instead, were the LOAC to include 
such a rule, it would be one of universal applicability. How would such a 
rule be translated into ROE language that is simple and clear enough to 
facilitate combat decision-making in the context of a medium or high-
intensity armed conflict against a declared hostile enemy? Just attempting 
to propose such a rule indicates the level of analytical complexity that 
would result, with its accordant tactical hesitation. For example, perhaps 
the ROE would initially indicate: “Redland forces are declared hostile and 
may be attacked at all times once positively identified unless captured or 
disabled by wounds.” But then the least harmful means rule would require 
a further qualifier: “However, if you assess that a positively identified 
member of the Redland forces cannot [meaningfully] [seriously] [viably] 
[genuinely] resist or threaten you or friendly forces, you are prohibited 
from engaging this enemy.” Just attempting to articulate (let alone imple-
ment) the limitation vis-à-vis an enemy force in a medium or high-intensity 
conflict reveals how inconsistent it would be with the art of war. 
Any individual who has trained or been trained on ROE can see imme-
diately how dangerous this qualifier would be. First, how does a soldier 
make this assessment? What is the standard of certainty? What happens 
when two soldiers disagree on this assessment? At what point would a 
                                                                                                                      
235. With regard to the complex training and accountability dilemmas produced by 








subordinate be obligated to disobey an order to attack a declared hostile 
enemy in order to comply with a least harmful means obligation? Ultimate-
ly, all of these implementation complexities translate into tactical hesitation. 
Soldiers would be subjected to the constant risk that their decisions to at-
tack an enemy, even after being positively identified, would be investigated 
and potentially condemned. Thus, deviating from the existing bright-line 
standard for determining when attack authority terminates will inevitably 
subject every use of force decision to an implied conduct based analysis, 
thereby diluting critical battlefield aggressiveness and initiative. 
The arguments for a least harmful means rule have developed most re-
cently in the context of COIN operations or attacks conducted during a 
sophisticated deliberate targeting process (such as air attacks). This focus, 
which severely oversimplifies the issue, highlights multiple reasons why 
such a rule is inconsistent with the LOAC and operationally unworkable. 
First, even these environments, in which the ROE often do include re-
straints akin to a least harmful means rule (leading proponents of such a 
rule to argue that it is indeed workable and obligatory236), demonstrate the 
complete disconnect from operational realities. Second, attempting to 
translate a least harmful means rule into a legal obligation in international 
armed conflicts is proof positive that such a rule simply cannot be recon-
ciled with the LOAC’s purposes or application. 
As a starting point, consider that if a least harmful means rule were law, 
every use of deadly force against an enemy belligerent would need to be 
justified by the individual threat that enemy operative was posing at the 
time. Attempting to discern which soldier fired which rounds, even in a 
discrete engagement in a COIN environment, is incredibly difficult.237 
Moreover, even in COIN combat rarely occurs as discrete events. Consider 
incidents in Afghanistan where insurgents attempted to overrun U.S. Army 
positions. Engagements at Combat Outpost Keating238 or the Wanat Val-
                                                                                                                      
236. Goodman, supra note 7; JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1985); NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
237. Consider the multiple investigations the U.S. Army conducted to determine the 
sequence of events that led to U.S. forces accidentally shooting fellow soldier Pat Tillman. 
See http://www.defense.gov/home/pdf/Tillman_Redacted_Web_0307.pdf (last visited 
May 2, 2013). 
238. The battle for COP Keating involved more than three hundred Taliban insur-
gents fighting fifty-three U.S. Army soldiers supported by artillery and air support for 
more than twelve hours. See http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/AR15-




 International Law Studies 2013 
616 
 
ley239 involved sustained engagements lasting hours. Thousands of small 
arms rounds fired, machine guns, grenades, mortar and artillery rounds and 
both rotary and fixed wing close air support, resulting in scores of insur-
gents killed and many more wounded. Proponents of a least harmful means 
rule tend to utilize sui generis and unrealistic hypotheticals to illustrate the 
rule’s application. Unfortunately, such methodology offers little opportuni-
ty to examine whether such a rule is actually feasible or desirable. Even 
when proposed in the context of imaginary situations, ones that are exceed-
ingly unlikely to arise, the rule’s application must still be contemplated in all 
types of combat engagements that will occur and where such a rule would 
be debilitating to combat initiative. What proponents of a least harmful 
means rule must (but cannot) do is explain how such a rule applies not only 
to engagements like COP Keating, or the Battle for Wanat Valley, but to 
close combat in the Ia Drang valley of Vietnam,240 the deliberate attack on 
the Panamanian Defense Forces Commandancia, or the potential battles of 
mass scale that will occur if war were to break out again in Korea.241 What 
then is the utility of a rule with no practical application?  
Although COIN operations dominate contemporary LOAC discus-
sions, the least harmful means rule would also apply in traditional interna-
tional armed conflict, where medium or high-intensity conflict involving 
both deliberate and time-sensitive targeting and service members of all lev-
els of expertise make such a rule even harder to reconcile. As much as a 
least harmful means rule fails to account for COIN combat realities like 
COP Keating or Wanat, that level of futility pales in comparison when 
considering high-intensity operations during international armed conflicts. 
In such conflicts, sustained combat operations are the default setting or 
                                                                                                                      
239. Similarly, the 2008 battle in Wanat Valley involved several hundred insurgents 
repeatedly attacking a forward outpost comprised of roughly forty-eight American and 
twenty-four Afghan soldiers. See http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/ 
csipubs/Wanat.pdf (last visited May 2, 2013). 
240. HAROLD G. MOORE AND JOSEPH GALLOWAY, WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND 
YOUNG—IA DRANG THE BATTLE THAT CHANGED THE WAR IN VIETNAM (1992) (de-
picting the United States’ first large scale battle in the Vietnam War, a four-day battle that 
claimed the lives of close to 250 American soldiers and roughly 1000 North Vietnamese). 
241. During the Korean War, there were instances of unarmed Chinese forces charg-
ing American positions employing the brutal—but often correct—calculus that there were 
more Chinese attackers than the Americans had time or ammunition to shoot during the 
attack. When the attackers reached the American positions, deadly hand-to-hand combat 
ensued where anything—a knife, a helmet, a rock—was used as a weapon. See T.R. FEH-








norm. Combat engagements flow into other engagements, often involving 
varying and differing units and modalities of force, leveraging and massing 
lethal force at the same target. The purpose of combat operations is to 
mass a range of effects at a decisive point in time and space. And a least 
harmful means rule would introduce indecision at the moment it can be 
least tolerated—actions on the objective. As noted earlier, military doctrine 
details the importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative, interrupting 
the enemy’s decision cycle and forcing the enemy to react.242 A least harm-
ful means rule would cede that initiative. In the process, most perversely, 
the least harmful means rule, articulated as an expression of humanity, 
would prove to be anything but and would very likely lead to more, not 
fewer, casualties on the battlefield. 
Even when international armed conflicts have been short in duration, 
such as the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, they nonetheless involve hundreds 
of thousands of soldiers on both sides employing lethal force. For example, 
U.S. Army VII Corps, which conducted the main attack of the war, led a 
coalition of 146,000 soldiers from several different nations,243 including 
over 1,500 tanks and mechanized assault vehicles, and 800 helicopters. 
They were involved in almost non-stop combat operations for 100 hours in 
discrete battles in places like Al Busayyah and Medina Ridge and in rolling 
engagements without clear beginning and end points.244 The least harmful 
means rule would require that each of those soldiers assess—before firing 
each round—whether the enemy belligerent could not be disabled by using 
less than lethal force.245 Consider also the prospect of ground maneuver 
                                                                                                                      
242. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
243. Proponents of a least harmful means rule utilize hypotheticals of discrete en-
gagements involving one state’s army encountering individual soldiers from an opposing 
force. This completely disregards the reality of not only joint operations involving other 
services’ ground, air, and artillery assets but combined operations involving multiple coun-
tries fighting together 
244. See U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF: 
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM AUGUST 1990–1991 (2010), available at 
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-117-1/CMH_70-117-1.pdf. 
245. Without a comprehensive understanding of combat operations and the thought 
process central to the effective execution of such operations, it can be hard to grasp how 
seemingly brutal tactics are nonetheless lawful and desirable. One classic example of this 
divergent mindset was the reaction to a tactic used during the first Gulf War, Operation 
Desert Storm. In order to effect the prompt submission of thousands of entrenched Iraqi 
soldiers, U.S. commanders settled on the tactic of using M-1 tanks fitted with earth mov-
ing blades to plow these functionally helpless enemy soldiers underneath their own 
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warfare in Korea—forces from the United States and Republic of Korea 
moving cross country, engaging enemy forces, could never even begin to 
have the time or ability to implement a least harmful means rule. The sight 
of an enemy who had discarded his weapon with hands held high is the 
type of clarity, and the only type of clarity, that facilitates the discrimina-
tion—mandated by one of the LOAC’s “intransgressible principles”246—
between which enemy belligerent is and is not properly an object of lethal 
attack.  
Apart from the fact that, as demonstrated in Sections I and II above, 
the positive LOAC does not include any such least harmful means obliga-
tion, these operational inconsistencies and obstacles are telling. In short, 
any such rule should only be embraced if it is effective and susceptible to 
implementation in the most difficult of contexts, for if it is indeed a LOAC 
obligation it must be respected in every operation. Ultimately, we believe 
the detrimental impact of this rule in the much more common context that 
has been and will continue to be the primary focus of the LOAC indicates 





                                                                                                                      
subjecting U.S. forces to the immensely dangerous task of dismounted trench clearance. 
The soldiers who executed these missions almost certainly caused the death of hundreds 
(if not thousands) of Iraqi soldiers who, in many cases, might well have posed little indi-
vidual threat. But collectively these trenches represented a major tactical and operational 
enemy threat, and therefore the use of lethal methods and means of warfare to produce 
submission and defeat this enemy was not only lawful, it was regarded within military cir-
cles as a model of tactical innovation. For the civilian press, however, the brutality of the 
tactic seemed somehow unjustifiably harsh. Were those troops really all that dangerous? 
Was there some less harmful means that might have spared many enemy lives? In contrast, 
for commanders who conceived of and executed this mission (and, we assume, the mili-
tary lawyers who advised them), the only relevant questions were whether this tactic con-
tributed to the prompt submission of the enemy in the collective sense and whether it was 
lawful—not whether there was a less harmful method or means (and likely less effective) 
to accomplish the same end. Their conclusion that it would was borne out in battle as 
hundreds of Iraqi soldiers (the overwhelming majority of those in the trenches) surren-
dered as rapidly as possible to avoid the fate of their comrades subjected to these attacks. 
See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Army Buried Iraqi Soldiers Alive in Gulf War, NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 
5, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/15/world/us-army-buried-iraqi-soldiers-
alive-in-gulf-war.html. 








 3. Investigations and Accountability 
 
Accountability would also become a far more complex issue than is cur-
rently the case, in a manner that inhibits both the effective implementation 
of the LOAC and accountability for violations. Under the current use of 
force paradigm, most battlefield killings are presumptively lawful, and ac-
countability focuses on the exceptions indicating an unreasonable applica-
tion of threat identification criteria, attacking enemy belligerents already 
rendered hors de combat by wounds or sickness, or deliberately attacking pro-
tected persons or places. Under a least harmful means rule, effectively in-
jecting a human rights use of force paradigm into the use of force equation, 
every attack on an enemy belligerent would ostensibly trigger an investiga-
tory requirement, creating a chilling effect on the warrior spirit and effec-
tiveness of armed forces.247  
The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Directive requires the 
military to promptly report and thoroughly investigate all “reportable inci-
dents.”248 A reportable incident is “a possible, suspected, or alleged viola-
tion of the law of war, for which there is credible information.”249 The 
threshold criteria for reporting are deliberately low.250 As a result, the U.S. 
military conducts inquiries, if not formal administrative investigations, fol-
lowing use of force situations that result in injury or death to someone not 
clearly identified as an enemy belligerent. Although the result can be a 
number of investigations ongoing at any one time, units currently do not 
investigate engagements where those who were wounded or killed were 
exclusively, and conclusively, enemy belligerents.  
Under a least harmful means rule, every use of lethal force, even against 
a positively identified enemy belligerent, would require an investigation to 
determine whether a lesser means of force was viable. Soldiers would know 
this—they would witness the numerous informal and formal inquiries into 
uses of force by their units. It would not take long for them to become in-
                                                                                                                      
247. Even without wounding, where lethal force was unsuccessfully employed and 
failed to even wound, the soldier firing possessed specific intent to wound or kill. Would a 
least harmful means rule require an investigation of an attempted violation? 
248. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Pro-
gram (2006) (Incorporating Change 1, November 15, 2010 Certified Current as of Febru-
ary 22, 2011) [hereinafter DoD Directive 2311.01E]; see also Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Instruction 5810.01B, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program (2002). 
249. DoD Directive 2311.01E, supra note 248, at 3-2. 
250. Dick Jackson, Reporting and Investigation of Possible, Suspected or Alleged Violations of 
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creasingly risk averse, hesitating to attack an enemy in order to avoid the 
potential consequences of investigatory second-guessing. Uses of force on 
the battlefield already occur in the “fog of war”; diluting the relatively 
bright lines that currently exist, even if proponents of the least harmful 
means rule argue that it would normally not apply to combat operations, 
cannot but have the effect of injecting additional uncertainty into life and 
death decisions to pull a trigger that must take place in split seconds. This 
consequence is simply unacceptable. 
 
 4. Protecting Soldiers’ Morality 
 
Finally, the LOAC plays a fundamental role in the protection of belliger-
ents, not only physically but morally as well. In this vein, the least harmful 
means rule and its proponents do not seem to truly appreciate the intense 
challenge of making the decision to take another human life, even when 
that decision is made in combat and the life taken is that of a positively 
identified enemy belligerent. Although it may be tempting to contemplate 
the ease with which indicia of no “genuine” threat could be assessed in 
combat, the reality is quite different. There is a necessary tactical and moral 
clarity that results from the existing bright-line hors de combat standard. Sol-
diers know, with relative certainty and without the need to engage in a to-
tality of the circumstances-type assessment, when to engage an enemy and 
when that authority terminates.  
The assurance and knowledge that the always difficult decision to take 
another human life was legally and operationally justified thus plays an im-
portant role in safeguarding and bolstering a soldier’s moral well-being. 
The importance of such clarity obviously contributes to tactical initiative. 
However, it also provides soldiers a sense of confidence that the suffering 
inflicted at their own hands when executing an order to attack enemy forc-
es was not only tactically necessary, but also morally justified.  In so doing, 
it contributes to preserving the bond of confidence between leaders and 
their troops, and also makes a subtle but essential contribution to good or-
der and discipline.  
Perhaps of equal importance is the benefit such clarity provides beyond 
the field of battle. Service members who engage in armed hostilities, no 
matter how inexperienced or experienced, or how attenuated they may be 
from the point of kinetic impact or from the means of warfare they un-
leash, must live with the moral and emotional consequences of knowing 








had to carry this burden can truly understand the enormity of its weight. 
Tactical clarity in the attack process provides moral clarity that aids in 
lightening this load, and this benefit should not be underestimated. The 
moral confidence that the deadly consequences of executing a duty were 
tactically justified and lawful, without having to question whether the harm 
inflicted in battle was “really necessary” is essential to protecting the moral 
integrity of combatants.251  
In this regard, the clarity derived from the LOAC’s use of force frame-
work contributes to the type of effective leadership that is essential to pre-
serve the good order and discipline of a fighting force. As James 
McDonough emphasized so poignantly in his memoir of small unit leader-
ship in Vietnam: 
 
I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their 
human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit 
the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep 
them civilized. That was my duty as their leader. . . . War gives 
the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must 
live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to 
                                                                                                                      
251. It might be tempting to question how a rule that permits attack on a functionally 
defenseless enemy can genuinely protect the moral integrity of a combatant. Some might 
argue that such a rule has the exact opposite effect—that it is morally corrosive. However, 
like the tactical value of the targeting presumptions provided by the law, the moral value 
that flows from these same presumptions must be assessed by focusing on those situa-
tions combatants are most likely to encounter in conflict, and not fanciful hypotheticals 
that rarely if ever arise in warfare. It would be folly to reject the moral value of a rule that 
is intended to address 99% of attack decisions because it might not be logically applied to 
1%. Moreover, in contemporary conflicts, unconventional tactics render the notion of 
assessing functional defenselessness even more impracticable. It is today common 
knowledge that many of the most significant threats confronted by U.S. and coalition 
forces in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq did not come from enemies carrying their 
arms openly, but from those employing improvised explosive devices triggered by seem-
ingly otherwise innocuous remote controls like garage door openers and cell phones, or 
suicide bombers wearing explosive vests under their clothes. Just as U.S. forces encoun-
tered enemies who feigned defenseless status in order to launch deadly attacks in places 
like the Pacific islands in World War II or Vietnam, close combat against determined en-
emies, whether conventional or unconventional, bears out the wisdom of placing the bur-
den to clearly manifest surrender on the enemy. Ultimately, no matter what rule applies, 
any killing in combat is susceptible to a lifetime of subjective second-guessing by the per-
son who knows she is responsible for the death. However, depriving the combatant of the 
clarity derived from the LOAC’s bright-line rule can only exacerbate this risk, not only for 
the sui generis situations proffered by proponents of the least harmful means rule, but for 
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help them understand that there are lines they must not cross. He 
is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity. If the leader loses 
his own sense of propriety or shrinks from his duty, anything will 
be allowed. 
 
. . . 
 
War is, at its very core, the absence of order; and the absence of 
order leads very easily to the absence of morality, unless the lead-
er can preserve each of them in its place.252 
 
Diluting tactical clarity will inevitably dilute this moral clarity. Soldiers 
do not have the luxury of pondering use of force decisions in the quiet and 
calm environment of academic debates; they make life and death decisions 
amidst the chaos of war. The law must provide maximum clarity to that 
process to facilitate not only the ability to accomplish the mission, but to 
protect the soldier herself from the corrosive moral consequences that 
come from questioning the legitimacy of taking life. 
Perhaps this explains why there is almost universal opposition among 
members of the military profession to any potential least harmful means 
rule or proposal. We certainly do not believe nor intend to suggest that ex-
perience in the armed forces is a necessary predicate to understanding the 
LOAC. However, such experience certainly does provide a relatively 
unique understanding of soldiers, training, and the demands imposed on 
our armed forces. Nor should it be overlooked that virtually the entire cor-
pus of the LOAC rests on a foundation laid by members of the profession 
of arms. Indeed, the symmetry between the LOAC and military logic lies at 
the very core of the law. Accordingly, no credible analysis of this issue can 
occur without a genuine and comprehensive consideration of the constitu-
ent who must implement a least harmful means rule. 
That constituent, in the overwhelming number of circumstances, is a 
young, junior service member who is taught to trust the decision-making 
criteria he or she is taught by superiors, and to act violently and aggressive-
ly when ordered to engage an enemy target. He completed basic combat 
training upon entering the military, training that “transforms civilians into 
soldiers.”253 At its core, basic military training is indoctrination on subordi-
                                                                                                                      
252. JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, PLATOON LEADER: A MEMOIR OF COMMAND IN 
COMBAT 77 (1985). 
253. In the U.S. Army, Basic Combat Training (BCT) is a ten-week training course 








nating oneself to the broader organization and unit purpose and mission. 
In the combat arms (infantry, armor, field artillery, attack aviation), the 
types of units most likely to be engaged in ground combat, basic Army and 
Marine Corps training is about breaking down the natural human instinct 
against employing combat power that is likely to take the life of a fellow 
human being.254 Basic training is also about developing basic combat skills, 
training to enable service members to instinctively and reflexively continue 
to accomplish their mission under the stressors of combat, fatigue, hunger 
and the literal and figurative fog of the battlefield.255 This description is not 
                                                                                                                      
selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage], how to work together as a team 
and what it takes to succeed as a Soldier in the U.S. Army.” See Basic Combat Training: The 
Ten-Week Journey from Civilian to Soldier, GOARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-
life/becoming-a-soldier/basic-combat-training.html (last visited May 2, 2013). Although 
the Army speaks in general terms about how BCT “pushes recruits’ minds and bodies to 
new limits, and gives them a deeper respect for themselves and those around them,” id. at 
http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/becoming-a-soldier/basic-combat-
training/graduation.html, it is important to place that in the context of the mission of the 
U.S. Army—“to fight and win [U.S.] wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance 
across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combat-
ant commanders.”  Organization, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/ 
(last visited May 2, 2013). 
254. See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING 
TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995). Grossman, who taught psychology at West Point, 
determined that most soldiers have a phobia-like resistance to using force and need to be 
specifically trained to kill. Noted military historian S.L.A. Marshal concluded that the 
American soldier comes “from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the tak-
ing of life, is prohibited and unacceptable….The fear of aggression has been expressed to 
him so strongly and absorbed by him so deeply and pervadingly—practically with his 
mother’s milk—that it is part of the normal man’s emotional make-up. This is his great 
handicap when he enters combat. It stays his trigger finger even though he is hardly con-
scious that it is a restraint upon him.” S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE PROB-
LEM OF BATTLE COMMAND 78 (1947). 
255. Basic training provides but a training foundation. Other military schools expand 
on that base. The U.S. Army Ranger School, for example, is the Army’s premier combat 
leader training course, from which only 50% of the students graduate. Ranger School is a 
physically and mentally grueling sixty-one-day course designed to replicate and prepare 
soldiers for the rigors of combat operations. During the course, service members operate 
on little sleep and food while training on small unit military tactics, including the conduct 
of raids and ambushes. See Ranger Training Brigade, U.S. ARMY MANEUVER CENTER OF EX-
CELLENCE, http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/RTB/(last visited May 2, 2013). 
Ranger school hones an almost primal appreciation for the importance of standardized 
operating procedures because at the small unit level, when soldiers are cold, tired, hungry, 
and stressed, the vast majority of their actions during combat are reactions and not the 
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offered to suggest that service members are automatons; far from it. But 
the hesitancy injected into the soldier’s decision-making process from a 
least harmful means rule would be potentially fatal to their tactical effec-
tiveness and, just as important, to their ability to function as moral human 
beings in the midst of a chaotic and violent enterprise. In this regard, it is 
helpful to remember the profoundly insightful passage from Telford Tay-
lor, the U.S. chief prosecutor at Nuremberg: 
 
War does not confer a license to kill for personal reasons—to gratify per-
verse impulses, or to put out of the way anyone who appears obnoxious, 
or to whose welfare the soldier is indifferent. War is not a license at all, 
but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it does not countenance the 
infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge. Unless troops are 
trained and required to draw the distinction between military and nonmil-
itary killings, and to retain such respect for the value of life that unneces-
sary death and destruction will continue to repel them, they may lose the 
sense for that distinction for the rest of their lives. The consequence 
would be that many returning soldiers would be potential murderers.256 
 
V. CONCLUSION: PRESERVING THE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS AND CORE 
PURPOSES 
 
Vigilance to avoid confusing what a military commander may do with what 
he must do is essential to preserve the integrity of the law and the funda-
mental nature of attack authority derived from the principle of military ne-
cessity. Such distortion of policy constraints into imagined legal obligations 
has almost certainly added weight to assertions that the LOAC includes a 
least harmful means obligation to forego attack with deadly combat power 
whenever capture might be feasible. The authors believe that these asser-
tions reflect a lack of appreciation for the nature of armed conflict and mil-
itary operations in general, and fundamentally alter the presumptions of 
permissible conduct that have provided operational clarity for individuals 
engaged in hostilities for more than two centuries. But what is most trou-
bling about this distortion is that it reflects a fundamental shift from a 
                                                                                                                      
tive training on clearly articulated and unchanging tactics, techniques, and procedures. A 
least harmful means rule assumes the ability of service members to employ calm, cool and 
independent decision-making wholly incongruent with the nature of combat and how 
solders must be trained.  
256. Telford Taylor, War Crimes, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFES-








LOAC-based theory of authority towards a human rights-based theory. It 
thus has severe consequences for both the LOAC and human rights law as 
critical protections for individuals in the face of violence and conflict. The 
proposal rests ultimately on a rejection of the significance of identifying an 
enemy as a “military objective”: the conclusive presumption that, until ren-
dered hors de combat, the threat inherent in that designation/determination 
justifies the employment of deadly force. Instead, by substituting for that 
presumption an unavoidable (and unfounded in the law) linkage between 
the authority to attack with deadly force and an assessment of actual threat 
represented by a belligerent target, the least harmful means rule denies such 
authority when that actual threat is marginal or non-existent. 
Many might see this result as simply adding greater protection to the 
LOAC, a seemingly admirable and universally appealing goal. The confla-
tion of human rights law and the LOAC inherent in the least harmful 
means rule is dangerous from either direction, however: it is likely to either 
emasculate human rights law’s greater protections or undermine the 
LOAC’s greater permissiveness in the use of force, either of which is a 
problematic result. Soldiers faced with an obligation to always consider less 
harmful means when attacking an enemy belligerent may well either refrain 
from attacking the target—leaving the mission unfulfilled or the innocent 
victims of an enemy force’s planned attack unprotected—or disregard the 
law as unrealistic and ineffective. Neither option is appealing. The former 
exposes friendly forces to unjustified risk and undermines the protection of 
innocent civilians from unlawful attack, both of which are core purposes of 
the LOAC. The latter weakens respect for the value and role of the LOAC 
altogether during conflict, a central component of the protection of all per-
sons in wartime.257 
                                                                                                                      
257. Ironically, this rule could also have a perverse influence on human rights law. If 
the imposition of a least harmful means rule caused the armed conflict rules for capture 
and surrender to bleed into the human rights and law enforcement paradigm, the re-
strictions on the peacetime use of force in self-defense would diminish. Outside of armed 
conflict, persons suspected of posing a threat to the safety of others or to society are enti-
tled to the same set of rights as other persons under human rights law. A relaxed set of 
standards will only minimize and infringe on those rights. If states begin to use lethal force 
as a first resort against individuals outside of armed conflict because the distinction be-
tween the use-of-force parameters in the two situations has disintegrated, the established 
framework for the protection of the right to life would begin to unravel. Not only would 
targeted individuals suffer from reduced rights, but innocent individuals in the vicinity 
would also be subject to significantly greater risk of injury and death as a consequence of 
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When humans cause such consequences, either through evil intent or 
mistake, the results are harmful enough. When the law itself facilitates con-
sequences that contradict its very purpose, the effects are exacerbated and 
simply too damaging to countenance. The law must, as it always has, re-
main animated by the realities of warfare in the effort to strike a continuing 
credible balance between the authority to prevail on the battlefield and the 
humanitarian objective of limiting unnecessary suffering. The clarity of the 
existing paradigm achieves that goal and scholars should be hesitant to 
tamper with it. 
